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Organizations of all sizes are vulnerable to critical material supply disruptions.  Although 
there is a significant body of literature that examines how large entities such as nations and 
governments can assess and mitigate criticality, there is very little work that addresses firm-level 
criticality in a way that is actionable for businesses.   This work uses literature review and case 
study analysis to understand the impact of critical material supply risk at the firm level, and to 
determine salient internal indicators.  A total of 42 criticality studies were reviewed and the 
findings were used to develop a framework to assess and monitor criticality risk using internal 
firm-specific data.  The framework incorporates three categories of risk including product 
concept viability, production, and profitability.  It also contains four key business functions 
including finance, procurement, marketing, and production. These aspects were chosen because 
they are relevant to all businesses that produce and sell manufactured goods, and because they 
represent dynamics that are within the control of an individual firm.  Unlike the global and 
national level indicators emphasized in most current research, the indicators proposed in this 
research are derived from data such that firms can compile it with reasonable ease.  Finally, this 
work considers the role of the organization in criticality risk assessment and mitigation through 
an examination of the data needed to complete the aforementioned framework and the likely 
sources of that information.  The findings of this analysis elucidate the gap between internal and 
external and micro and macro criticality assessment, as well as provide a framework for firm-
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1.  Background 
The extraction and use of raw metals for the production of goods and technologies has 
increased by 19 times over the past 100 years.  The use of some individual metals, such as 
aluminum, has increased by a factor as high as 1000 (Graedel, Barr et al. 2012).  Because these 
raw materials are used by a rapidly growing global population for a wide range of products, 
demand is expected to increase further. The rapid consumption of some of these finite 
resources—such as cobalt, rhenium, platinum group metals, and rare earth elements—is 
noteworthy because these materials are strategically important for renewable and clean energy 
technologies, national defense, numerous technological innovations that improve our daily lives 
(e.g., smart phones, laptops, healthcare equipment), and even emerging methods of urban 
agriculture that require artificial lighting to produce food.  Referred to as critical materials, these 
minerals and metals are vulnerable to supply disruptions and price volatility.  In order to mitigate 
risk and promote the sustainable development of the technologies that depend upon them, 
demand for critical materials must be monitored and supply must be managed.  In addition to the 
environmental and social benefits of critical material-dependent products such as solar panels, 
wind turbines, and electric vehicles, there are financial benefits.  Many economies, including the 
U.S., are heavily dependent on critical raw materials for manufacturing as well as the underlying 
science and technology innovations that make them competitive.  To maintain the innovation and 
economic growth that drives society forward and makes it possible for future generations to 
enjoy the same or better quality of life as the current generation, the firms that rely on critical 
materials need to understand and be able to mitigate their risk. 
 The precise definition of a critical material varies but here we focus on two dimensions 
for firms: (a) supply disruptions and (b) high economic and/or strategic importance. 
Supply Disruption:  Critical material supply disruptions are caused by many different and 
often interdependent dynamics.  For example, scarcity concerns the physical availability of 
materials and can be measured by factors such as crustal abundance, reserve levels, mine 
production, static depletion times, and national stockpiles.  Other factors that can cause supply 
disruption include natural disasters, politics, conflict, production bottlenecks, and lack of 
producer diversity.   
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Some materials have codependence with primary production, for example cobalt and 
tellurium are commercially obtained as a byproduct of copper mining.  This can cause supply 
issues as an increase in demand of the byproduct material may not have an economic impact on 
the production of the parent material (Bustamante and Gaustad 2014).  Import reliance and lack 
of producer diversity may exacerbate other supply issues (Bustamante and Gaustad 2014) (Buijs 
and Sievers 2011) (Gunn 2014). Geopolitical risk is defined as political and governance activity 
across the globe that may restrict or limit critical material availability.  Components of this 
category may include conflict, political instability, violence, government trade policies and 
interventions, corruption, and government effectiveness.   
Volatility in demand may cause supply risk due to unbalanced markets, competing 
technology demand, and artificial inventory fluctuations across the supply chain (i.e. the 
bullwhip effect).  Ecological damage that occurs as a result of raw material extraction and 
processing, such as soil degradation, air pollution, water contamination, and loss of biodiversity 
may cause supply risk issues if producing firms cannot keep up with regulatory compliance.  
 For each cause of supply disruptions there are multiple indicators used to identify supply 
risk.  Achzet and Helbig (2013) found that the most frequently observed indicators are country 
risk, country production concentration, depletion time, and by-product dependency.  The next 
most frequently observed indicators are company concentration in mining corporations, demand 
growth projections followed by recycling and recyclability, substitutability, import dependence, 
and commodity prices (Achzet and Helbig 2013).  Less common indicators include things such 
as production costs in extraction, stock keeping, mine/refinery capacity, future market capacity, 
and investment in mining (Achzet and Helbig 2013). 
Economic and Strategic Importance:  A key impact of critical material supply disruption is 
market vulnerability to sudden price spikes (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010) (Graedel, Barr et al. 2012).  
Price spikes affect firm competitiveness by creating uncertainty in costs, product pricing, 
earnings, and credit availability, thus affecting short-term profitability and long-term survival 
(Agarwal, Ofori et al. 2012).  Surveys and reports published by leading business consulting firms 
highlight this as a growing concern among modern businesses and the academic literature 
supports these findings (Agarwal, Ofori et al. 2012) (Schoolderman and Mathlener 2011).    
Additional studies (e.g. (Chapman, Christopher et al. 2002) (Helferich and Cook 2002) (Martha 
and Subbakrishna 2002)), have also reported costly consequences of disruptions.  
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Recent emphasis on lean supply chain management principles in corporations makes firms 
more vulnerable to supply disruptions because they tend to have limited stockpiles.  It also poses 
significant challenges for supply chain managers tasked with maintaining operational efficiencies 
while also increasing supply resilience (Hendricks and Singhal 2005a).  Material shortages can 
slow or halt production in manufacturing plants, increase costs, and quickly diminish a firm’s 
competitive advantage and revenue.  For example, in early 2000 a phone chip supply disruption 
caused by a fire in a manufacturing plant impacted two companies, Nokia and Ericsson.  Nokia 
responded aggressively to the supply disruption by securing alternate suppliers, modifying 
product designs to accommodate different chips, and communicating regularly with the original 
manufacturer.  Ericsson was slow to take action and therefore unable to expediently secure an 
alternate supplier.  As a result, the company sustained an estimated revenue loss of $400 million 
and soon after exited the consumer cell phone market (Sheffi and Rice Jr 2005). 
As demonstrated in the Ericsson case, negative consequences of critical material supply 
disruptions in sectors such as manufacturing, transportation, electric power, and 
telecommunications can be enduring and can impact multiple business sectors.  In a study of 
supply chain disruptions in publicly traded firms, Hendricks and Singhal found that stock 
returns, share price volatility, and profitability are all negatively impacted by supply disruptions 
(Hendricks and Singhal 2005a, Hendricks and Singhal 2005b).  Across nearly 800 disruptions 
analyzed, stock returns were found to drop, on average, 33% to 40% over a three year time 
period and, notably, Hendricks and Singhal assert that this underperformance can be observed in 
the year prior to the supply disruption (Hendricks and Singhal 2005a).  Share prices were found 
to have 13.5% higher volatility in the year following the supply disruption than in the year prior 
to the disruption (Hendricks and Singhal 2005a).  In terms of impact to firm profitability, 
Hendricks and Singhal reported that, on average, firms that experienced a supply disruption 
faced an operating income decrease of 107%, a drop in return on sales of 114%, a drop in return 
on assets of 93%, 7% lower sales growth, 11% growth in cost, and 14% growth in inventories 
(Hendricks and Singhal 2005b).   
In terms of recovery, Hendricks and Singhal found that it can take two or more years to 
return to the performance levels prior to a disruption (Hendricks and Singhal 2005a).  Some 
firms never return to the same performance levels that existed prior to the disruption (Sheffi and 
Rice Jr 2005).  Additionally, firms lack clear contingency plans and well-defined roles for 
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managing disruptions. Mitroff and Alpaslan assessed the crisis readiness of Fortune 500 
companies over two decades and found that 75% to 95% of companies analyzed were not 
prepared for any kind of disruptive event (Mitroff and Alpaslan 2003). This was further 
corroborated by Hillman and Keltz (Hillman and Keltz 2007). 
Commonly cited criticality mitigation strategies from a national and international perspective 
include increasing resiliency to supply disruptions and developing leading indicators of such 
disruptions.  Ways to build resiliency primarily relate to the production and processing of raw 
materials.  This could mean improving extraction methods to make the production of critical raw 
materials more cost efficient, less damaging to the environment, and less prone to labor 
exploitation; increasing end-of-life material recovery efforts; manipulating trade policy and 
international relations to minimize the negative impacts of controlling producers such as China; 
and diversifying production whenever possible to offset supply vulnerability caused by 
producers with a supply monopoly.  Additional strategies include the development of substitute 
materials and dematerialization.  The development of leading indicators is more complex 
because drivers of supply threats include things like geopolitical conflict, political corruption, 
physical scarcity, and natural disasters which are difficult to quantify and prone to uncertainty.   
The critical material frameworks developed by entities like the U.S. Department of Energy 
and the EU reflect the complex web of factors that contribute to criticality.  They generally 
include indicators that span three categories, social, environmental, and economic.  For example, 
country concentration, by-product dependency, production costs in extraction, risk of strategic 
use, market balance, and climate change vulnerability.  To quantify these indicators requires data 
that is not easily accessible, as well as high-level expertise to analyze that data, which 
furthermore must be aggregated into an indexed score.  For example, to determine the supply 
risk of a given critical material could involve information about geological availability (i.e., 
where in the world does the material naturally occur), technical availability (i.e., can the material 
be economically extracted), and environmental and/or social barriers to mining the material (e.g., 
water contamination, labor disputes, armed conflict).  Risk may also need to be assessed 
temporally (e.g., short term vs. medium term), further complicating an already time and resource 
intensive process. 
Unlike the national and international bodies that have developed systematic frameworks for 
assessing criticality, most firms lack an integrated and recurring way to track and measure 
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critical material supply disruptions in a way that is adaptable to their specific business operations 
and strategies. Firms have access to published findings such as the U.S. Department of Energy’s 
Critical Materials Strategy (2011) but have little control or leverage on the external factors 
emphasized in many current criticality assessment methodologies.  Whereas governments can 
influence trade policies, regulations, and other macro level factors that impact both demand and 
supply of critical materials, firms rarely have influence outside of the primary tiers of their 
supply chains.  An individual firm can’t access government stockpiles of critical materials, levy 
tariffs, or resolve political conflicts that inhibit production of critical materials.  And yet, firms 
do influence demand for critical materials through the technologies and products that they 
choose to develop and bring to market.  There is a disconnect between the demand created by 
firms and the critical material supply. 
 
1.2. Research Objectives 
This work aims to address the following research questions: 
 What is the specific impact of criticality to firms? 
 How can firms create a criticality risk assessment framework that can be used 
efficiently and effectively for their specific business operations and strategies? 
 
In terms of broader impact, this research is intended to develop a concept (i.e., a framework), 
for firm-level criticality assessment and mitigation based on insight gained from a review of the 
literature, an analysis of current assessment practices at the firm-level, and analysis of two 
industry-specific criticality scenarios (aviation and controlled environment agriculture).   
 
2. Chapter 2 – Methodology 
2.1. Methods 
Criticality assessment is a complex undertaking with internal and external variables as well 
as macro and micro level variables. There are also several levels of analysis (e.g. global, 
national, industry, material, country of origin), and many different analysis methodologies such 
as traditional risk assessment, supply chain management, and sustainability practice.  Given this, 
a multi-factor approach was used to examine critical material supply risk from a firm 
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perspective.  First, literature review was conducted in an effort to understand how criticality is 
currently being assessed.  Second, an exploratory case study of the use of rhenium in the aviation 
industry was used to evaluate the impact of critical material price volatility on firm performance.  
Third, eleven existing firm-level studies (Rosenau-Tornow, Buchholz et al. 2009, Duclos, Otto et 
al. 2010, Lloyd, Clifton et al. 2012, Lloyd, Lee et al. 2012, Nieto, Guelly et al. 2013, Bensch, 
Kolotzek et al. 2015, Gardner and Colwill 2016, Lapko, Trucco et al. 2016, Hallstedt and 
Isaksson 2017, Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018)—a subset of the 42 studies initially reviewed and 
noted in section 1.2—were analyzed to identify data and indicators for criticality assessment.  
Fourth, a firm-level risk analysis was conducted to determine internal indicators relevant to firm-
level supply disruption mitigation.  Finally, a framework for firm-level criticality assessment was 
developed by combining the above analysis, firm organizational structures, and the role of 
inventory and demand management as characterized by an established economic phenomenon, 
the bullwhip effect.   
 
2.2.   Literature Review  
There is a large body of literature that defines criticality, identifies specific materials as 
critical, and establishes clear indicators of criticality.  The literature also examines the formal 
methodologies that have been developed by nations and governments for the purpose of 
assessing and mitigating criticality (Graedel and Reck 2016).  The U.S. Department of Energy, 
the U.S. Department of Defense, the European Union, and Germany are just some examples. 
There are also initiatives between government and industry that exist for the purpose of 
addressing critical material supply risk (e.g., the U.S. Critical Materials Institute, the European 
Institute of Innovation and Technology Raw Materials in the EU, the National Institute of 
Materials Science in Japan).  Each of these entities is concerned with things like the quantities of 
critical raw materials consumed, extracted, imported, and exported in their respective 
geographical areas and globally; trade dependencies and other vulnerabilities stemming from the 
high production concentration of some critical materials in places like China; the particular uses 
of critical materials; future demand for critical raw materials; and future uses of critical raw 
materials.   
A review of 42 of the most relevant criticality studies to-date was conducted in an effort to 
understand how criticality is currently being assessed.  These studies include peer-reviewed 
 12 
journal articles, research project reports, and policy reports.  We conducted our search using 
Google Scholar, ScienceDirect, Wiley Online Library, and Web of Science.  Keywords queried 
include critical material supply risk, critical material framework, criticality assessment, criticality 
framework, raw materials criticality, and raw material assessment.  The overall set of literature 
identified included topics such as material recovery and recycling, demand forecasting, supply 
chain resilience, supply chain management, crisis readiness, and criticality assessment 
methodologies.  We focused on studies that specifically addressed criticality assessment and that 
did so using a defined scope, explicit risk indicators, and a model, framework, or framework.  
For broad studies that didn’t address firm-level criticality assessment we relied on the more 
highly cited works.  We did not use any criteria for firm-level studies.  Our goal was to identify 
all literature that incorporated a firm-level scope.  
The metrics used in each study can be organized into six broad categories as follows, with 
significant overlap among these categories.   
• Scarcity risk concerns the physical availability of critical materials.  Indicators may 
include crustal abundance, reserves, mine production, static depletion times, stockpiles, 
substitutability, and recycling.   
• Geopolitical risk quantifies risk stemming from political and governance activity across 
the globe that may restrict or limit material availability. Geopolitical dynamics impact the 
export, pricing, and regulations of materials supplied.  The most commonly used 
indicator is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which can show the presence of 
monopolies.  The World Governance Indicators (WGI) are the primary geopolitical 
stability indicators used to weight the HHI.  This category also includes regulatory and 
compliance indicators.  As shown in section 5.1 in Appendix A, cobalt is an instructive 
example of how geopolitical risk can impact criticality.  
• Demand risk is a key determinant of material availability that considers the volatility of 
demand relative to a supplier’s ability to scale up or down.  It is most often assessed 
using demand projections derived from sources like consultancy and market analyst 
reports, expert opinion, and assumed annual growth rates relative to economic growth.   
• Environmental risk considers environmental damage that may occur as a result of raw 
material extraction and processing.  The primary tool used for this assessment is the 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI). Life cycle assessment (LCA), and the 
 13 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
are also used to assess environmental risk. 
• Supply chain risk refers to factors that can influence material procurement due to 
suppliers, manufacturers, and distributors of critical materials.  Examples include the 
number of suppliers of a given material as well as the physical concentration of a material 
in a particular geographic area (e.g. a country).  
• Market risk is a determinant of the market viability of products that rely on critical 
materials.  The primary factor of market risk in this context is material price. Indicators 
include price volatility, price spikes, cost competition, and ability to pass on increased 
costs to consumers.  One example of market risk is a price spike due to rapid market 
adoption of products containing critical materials such as electric vehicles or solar panels.  
Another example is competing demand for critical materials due to emerging 
technologies in different industries and/or novel applications of critical materials.  
Although the actual materials assessed and the specific metrics used vary from one study to 
the next, each study aims to assess criticality in terms of vulnerability to supply disruptions.  The 
studies reviewed represent criticality metrics in addition to those proposed by the U.S. National 
Research Council (NRC) in 2008.  The NRC was among the first research groups to suggest 
metrics that consisted of two key dimensions of criticality: supply risk and impact of supply 
disruption.  All of the evaluated studies are listed in Table 6.1. in Appendix A. 
The major point of distinction among the studies reviewed is the scope of each criticality 
assessment, which varies from global, to European, to national, to firm level.  Of the 42 studies, 
10 assess criticality at the global level exclusively (Buchert, Schüler et al. 2009, Rosenau-
Tornow, Buchholz et al. 2009, Bauer, Diamond et al. 2010, Bauer, Diamond et al. 2011, Brown, 
Bide et al. 2011, Achzet and Helbig 2013, Helbig, Kolotzek et al. 2017, Sustainability, Survey et 
al. 2017, Brown 2018, Jasiński, Cinelli et al. 2018), 4 focus exclusively on Europe (EC 2010, EC 
2014, Deloitte Sustainability et al. 2017, Blengini et al. 2017), 9 focus exclusively at the national 
level (Council 2008, Morley and Eatherley 2008, Angerer, Marscheider-Weidemann et al. 2009, 
AEA Technology 2010, AEA Technology 2011, Hatayama and Tahara 2015, Glöser-Chahoud, 
Tercero Espinoza et al. 2016, Bach, Finogenova et al. 2017, Daw 2017), and 11 focus 
exclusively on the corporate or firm level (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010, Lloyd, Clifton et al. 2012, 
Lloyd, Lee et al. 2012, Nieto, Guelly et al. 2013, Bensch, Kolotzek et al. 2015, Gardner and 
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Colwill 2016, Lapko, Trucco et al. 2016, Miehe, Schneider et al. 2016, Hallstedt and Isaksson 
2017, Gardner and Colwill 2018, Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018).  An additional 7 studies address 
the global, national, and firm levels (Graedel, Barr et al. 2012, Graedel, Gunn et al. 2014, 
Graedel, Harper et al. 2015, Graedel, Harper et al. 2015, Nassar, Graedel et al. 2015, Helbig, 
Wietschel et al. 2016, Knobloch, Zimmermann et al. 2018). The final study in the group of 42 
focuses on the global and national level (Nassar, Graedel et al. 2015).  There is a useful diversity 
of approaches within each scope as well.  The British Geological Survey provides a supply risk 
assessment index that considers factors that effect material availability for 42 elements at the 
global level (Brown, Bide et al. 2011).  Conversely, the Öko Institute provides assessment 
methodology for just a select few materials required for renewable and energy efficient 
technologies at the global level (Buchert, Schüler et al. 2009). The parameters of the studies 
conducted on a national level differ by country.  Developed nations such as the U.S., the U.K., 
and Germany each focus on criticality assessment methods that affect their respective economies 
specifically.   
As evidenced by the literature discussion above and in Appendix A, the majority of the 
existing work on criticality assessment focuses on risk quantification derived from primarily 
external factors (e.g. geological and economic availability, policy and regulation, geopolitical 
risk, environmental, etc.).  While fundamentally relevant to criticality, external factors can’t be 
directly controlled by individual firms.  For example, some of the most frequently used 
indicators concern supply from a geopolitical perspective.  These include the Policy Potential 
Index, the Human Development Index, the World Governance Indicators, and the Fund for 
Peace’s Failed State Index.  Intended to capture risk in the countries that supply critical materials 
(due to things like taxation and regulation, vulnerability to political conflict or collapse, standard 
of living, government corruption, and likelihood of violence), these indicators are even further 
outside the sphere of influence of an individual firm.  Nevertheless, ten out of eleven firm-level 
studies incorporated one or more indicators in the geopolitical category (Rosenau-Tornow, 
Buchholz et al. 2009, Duclos, Otto et al. 2010, Lloyd, Clifton et al. 2012, Lloyd, Lee et al. 2012, 
Nieto, Guelly et al. 2013, Bensch, Kolotzek et al. 2015, Lapko, Trucco et al. 2016, Miehe, 
Schneider et al. 2016, Hallstedt and Isaksson 2017, Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018). 
While a majority of the studies incorporated demand indicators, only four of the eleven 
studies that consider the firm-level perspective incorporated such indicators in their assessment 
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methodologies (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010, Bensch, Kolotzek et al. 2015, Lapko, Trucco et al. 
2016, Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018).  Demand is relevant to any business and as such, most firms 
use forecasting tools to predict future product sales for themselves and competitors within their 
industry.  However, forecasting for other industries that might compete for the same materials is 
often outside of a firm’s scope.   
Although many studies did include some criticality indicators that are environmental in 
scope, these were primarily regulatory in nature.  From a business perspective, the implication 
here is that environmental indicators of criticality, such as material recovery potential, 
recyclability, and R&D funding committed to the development of substitute materials, aren’t 
relevant to firms.  Also absent from studies reviewed in this work are metrics related to lost 
profit correlated to environmental harm caused by a firm’s use of critical materials, or lost profit 
due to negative media exposure related to that environmental harm.  Furthermore, no studies 
could be found that consider specific environmental impacts such as air, land, and water 
pollution, carbon emissions, or hazardous waste, as they specifically relate to obtaining and using 
critical materials at the firm level.  In their work on material supply chain resilience, Sprecher et 
al. report that environmental considerations were omitted from their framework altogether 
because their interviewees indicated little to no concern for them (Sprecher, Daigo et al. 2015).  
A total of 13 regulatory and compliance indicators were found in the environmental, geopolitical, 
and supply chain categories; all of them were external and none of them directly considered 
environmental impact caused by firms or any downstream effect to firm profit.  These indicators 
are listed in Table 6.2 in Appendix B. 
 
2.3. Exploratory Case Study 
The case study approach used in this paper was chosen because the research conducted here 
is preliminary and primarily conceptual.  Very little work has been done on firm-level criticality 
assessment to date, and this approach allows criticality assessment to be explored from the 
perspective and scope of a firm rather than that of geography, politics, or the environment, all of 
which are extremely broad and have been studied extensively.  Through the use of two firm-level 
case studies we can begin to establish parameters around firm-level criticality risk.   
The first case looks at the aviation industry’s use of one material (rhenium), used in one 
application (jet turbine blades), in one industry.  This case specifically examines the price 
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volatility of rhenium and its impact on the cost of production of jet engines. Price volatility is the 
chosen metric because it is easily measurable and material costs have significant impacts on the 
financial well-being of firms.   
To conduct the aviation case study, the following steps were taken.  First, historical pricing, 
supply (in terms of world reserves and production), consumption, and material applications for 
rhenium were established using data from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) (John 2015, 
Polyak 2018).  Second, the material cost of the amount of rhenium required to manufacture one 
jet engine was estimated using data from Rolls-Royce plc (a leading manufacturing of jet 
engines), and pricing date from the USGS.  Third, the pricing data was plotted over time in real 
dollars and in 2017 (inflation adjusted) dollars.  Fourth, the material fraction of total material 
cost for one jet engine was calculated.  This was done using the dry engine weight of one jet 
engine and the average amount of rhenium needed for one jet engine.  Given the material 
fraction, material cost was determined using the price of rhenium in a given year, and the list 
price per jet engine.  This metric was calculated based on 2008 and 2017 rhenium prices.  The 
year 2008 was chosen because the rhenium market experienced a price spike at that time.  The 
year 2017 was chosen because it was the most recent year for which the USGS published 
rhenium pricing data.  Finally, the rhenium fraction of total cost (%) and the price of rhenium per 
kg ($USD) were plotted against the year-over-year change in gross margin which was obtained 
from corporate annual reports. The specific calculations were made using the following 
parameters and assumptions: the jet engine used in this analysis is the Trent XWB manufactured 
by Rolls-Royce plc.; the average amount of rhenium needed to manufacture engines for one 
aircraft is 50kg; the list price per engine in 2017 was $35M USD; and gross margin data is based 
on revenue from the aviation sector only, as listed in Rolls-Royce plc annual reports.   
The second case looks at the lighting industry’s use of six critical materials (cerium, 
europium, gadolinium, gallium, indium, and yttrium), that are used to manufacture horticultural 
LED lighting.  This case examines market demand rather than price volatility in order to 
highlight a second aspect of criticality that our work found to be prevalent.  Specifically, market 
demand has material impacts on supply pressures commonly associated with criticality and, in 
the case of horticultural LEDs, market demand is generated by multiple market sectors such as 
electronics, healthcare, and general lighting.  This means that the supply of critical materials 
needed for strategically important technologies (e.g., sustainable technologies), could be diverted 
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to economically important applications (e.g., consumer electronics), regardless of the 
sustainability implications. 
The methodological approach to the controlled environment agriculture case study has two 
components: the critical materials used in horticultural lighting, and the amount of light needed 
given certain food production requirements.  In terms of critical materials, the first step was to 
establish the critical material composition (i.e., the type and quantity of materials), of LED grow 
lamps. Second, the critical material intensity (i.e., the type and quantity of materials needed to 
produce one unit of something), was determined. In this case, sole source lighting, as applied in 
controlled environment agriculture, is the thing being produced. One unit is defined as the 
number of grow lamps needed to produce an amount of food needed by a given population over 
a given period of time.  Finally, the costs of the types and quantities of critical materials required 
by LED grow lamps were calculated and analyzed in terms of one unit of production.  
Critical material composition was based on data in a 2017 report published by the Nordic 
Council of Ministers (Punkkinen et al 2017).  The authors compiled multiple data sources and 
presented their findings in terms of estimated average weight per bulb.  In order to account for 
differences across manufacturers, the authors assume an average weight of 0.185 kg per unit. 
Because the critical material composition data identified in the literature was given in composite 
form rather than by specific grow lamp product, we identified a typical light fixture—a high bay 
LED horticultural lamp manufactured by CREE—to serve as a proxy.  The critical material 
composition per high bay LED fixture is listed in Table 7.1.1. in Appendix C. 
The amount of light needed was defined in terms of number of fixture hours.  The number of 
fixtures is a factor of the amount and quality of light emitted by a given grow lamp.  The number 
of hours is a factor of the amount and quality of light required by a given crop.  The total amount 
of light needed for a given level of food production was determined based on dietary needs, crop 
yields, required food production by mass, growing space, and plant light requirements.   
In order to define a certain level of food production, a number of assumptions were made.  
First, a sample diet consisting of fruits and vegetables only was defined based on the United 
States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) “Healthy U.S.-Style Eating Pattern” 
recommendations for moderately active adults (2015). This information is shown in Table 7.1.2. 
in Appendix C.  The sample diet consists of a total of 13 crops (peppers, broccoli, cantaloupe, 
eggplant, green beans, kale, onions, potatoes, spinach, strawberries, summer squash, and 
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tomatoes), across the five categories of vegetables (i.e., dark green, red and orange, legumes, 
starchy, and other), and one category of fruit as specified in the USDA dietary guidelines (2015).  
Next, based on the USDA intake recommendations (by volume), and crop yields per crop, the 
amount of physical growing space needed to produce enough food for one person for one year 
was calculated (2015).  This information is presented in Table 7.1.3. in Appendix C.  Having 
established the square footage requiring artificial lighting, the number of grow lamps required to 
grow sufficient food was determined based on the amount and duration of light required by each 
crop relative to the amount of light provided by one grow lamp.  An explanation of how to 
determine the amount of light required by crop, is included in Appendix C.  Next, the total 
number of grow lamps needed to grow enough fruits and vegetables for one person for one year 
using sole source lighting in a controlled environment agriculture setting was calculated.   
Finally, critical material intensity was calculated based on the critical material composition 
of one LED bulb, the population being fed, dietary requirements, growing space, and lighting 
requirements.  To feed one person for one year under the scenario modeled in this work would 
require 12 high bay LED bulbs.  To feed the projected world population in 2050 would require 
approximately 113.2 billion high bay LED bulbs. A schematic representing the methodology for 
determining critical material intensity is presented in Figure 7.2.1. in Appendix C. 
 
2.4.  Analysis of Existing Firm-Level Frameworks 
The 11 existing firm-level studies identified in section 2.2. contain a total of 96 indicators of 
criticality studies (Rosenau-Tornow, Buchholz et al. 2009, Duclos, Otto et al. 2010, Lloyd, 
Clifton et al. 2012, Lloyd, Lee et al. 2012, Nieto, Guelly et al. 2013, Bensch, Kolotzek et al. 
2015, Gardner and Colwill 2016, Lapko, Trucco et al. 2016, Hallstedt and Isaksson 2017, 
Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018).  Analysis of these indicators included sorting them into the six 
broad categories of risk outlined in section 2.2. (scarcity, geopolitical, demand, environmental, 
supply chain, and market risk), and then breaking them down further into sub-categories based 
on the specific aim of each indicator.  For example, within the category of scarcity, six sub-
categories were identified: physical/geological abundance (e.g. abundance of a given material in 
the earth’s crust); production capacity (e.g. utilization of mine/refinery capacity); recycling (e.g. 
recyclability of a given material); stock/reserves (e.g. known stockpiles); substitutability (e.g. 
firm’s ability to substitute one material for another due to supply disruption); and supply (e.g. 
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percent of world supply used).  Next, each indicator was identified as having an internal or 
external scope.  Out of the 96 indicators identified, 79 were classified as external and 17 were 
classified as internal.  Examples of indicators classified as internal in scope include impact on 
revenue, non-forecasted upside demand, delivery capability, and potential cost increase.  
Examples of indicators in the external scope include future market capacity, concentration risk, 
co-production risk, and environmental regulation.  A table of the indicators reflecting this 
analysis and identifying the study from which each indicator was found can be found in 
Appendix A in the supplemental material (Griffin et al 2019). 
 
2.5. Internal Indicators for Firm-Level Risk Assessment and Mitigation 
Informed by the analysis of existing firm-level frameworks, a novel set of internal indicators 
intended to support the assessment of supply risk at the firm level was developed (Griffin et al 
2019).  Criteria used to select indicators included the availability of data needed for criticality 
assessment; the frequency with which that data is generated; the accessibility of the data in the 
regular course of business (i.e. whether or not the data is already being collected, analyzed, 
reported, etc.); the potential for a firm to influence the data being collected through its business 
strategies and objectives; the extent to which the indicators as a whole address the basic 
functions of any typical business; and the alignment of the indicators with existing key 
performance metrics such as revenue, profit, stock price, etc.   
 
2.6. Developing a Novel Framework 
The framework for firm-level criticality assessment was designed with the goal of being 
relevant to most any business that produces and/or sells manufactured goods, and to incorporate 
all major operational aspects of such firms.  To accomplish this, three categories of risk to 
manufacturing-related firms were defined: profitability, design and concept viability, and 
production. The first category is intended to capture threats to the fundamental integrity (i.e. a 
product’s ability to meet performance requirements if an originally specified critical material 
experiences a supply disruption), and market potential of products that rely on a given critical 
material.  The second category is intended to capture threats to the manufacturing and 
distribution of products that rely on a given critical material.  The third category is intended to 
capture threats to the financial sustainability of firms that produce products that rely on a given 
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critical material.  The selection of indicators for each risk category was driven by four core 
business functions that incorporate all activities needed to produce and/or sell manufactured 
product—finance, procurement, marketing, and production—as well as their potential to 
generate actionable data (Griffin et al 2019).   
Unlike the global and national level indicators emphasized in most current research, these 
indicators must be derived from primary (and often proprietary), data.  In addition, because the 
aim of this research is to provide an accessible resource for many different kinds of firms, this 
data must generally be available in the normal course of business such that firms can compile it 
with reasonable ease.  The ultimate goal of the proposed internal indicators is to facilitate a 
holistic and multifaceted analysis of critical material supply disruption risk at the firm level 
(Griffin et al 2019).  
 
2.7. Data 
The data used in this research can be understood in three categories: academic, corporate, and 
government.  A search of the academic literature provided data about current approaches and 
practices related to criticality assessment and mitigation.  Examples include assessment 
frameworks, criticality rating systems, and lists of materials determined by the scientific 
community to be critical.  Commonly cited journals include Resources Policy, Environmental 
Science & Technology, and Resources, Conservation, and Recycling.  The academic literature 
also provided material composition data used to calculate estimated material requirements. 
Corporate documents included annual financial reports which provided insight to a firm’s 
awareness of criticality risk.  Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated filings provided 
historical financial information used to analyze trends in revenue and profit. Additional corporate 
data included product specifications published in marketing materials. 
Government data came from multiple sources including the British Geological Survey, the 
European Union Commission, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of 
Energy, and the U.S. Geological Survey.  This data included information about the physical, 
economic, and strategic characteristics of critical materials. 
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 Chapter 3 - Results 
Current literature suggests that the impact of critical materials at the firm level is evident in 
supply disruptions, short-term profitability, and long-term financial sustainability.   
To assess this assertion, two case studies were conducted.  The first examines the impact of 
rhenium price volatility on the aviation industry.  The second examines the impact of rare earth 
elements, gallium, and yttrium price volatility on controlled environment agriculture.  Price 
volatility was selected as the impact factor because material cost is highly relevant for 
manufacturing firms and because firms have direct access to purchasing and pricing data for at 
least the first tier of their supply chains.  Firms also have some ability to influence the prices they 
pay through procurement and inventory strategies like hedging.  The aviation industry was 
selected because it is the largest consumer of rhenium.  Controlled environment agriculture was 
selected because an increasing percentage of the world’s food supply will need to be grown 
indoors due to the negative impacts of climate change on conventional agriculture; in order to do 
so, a substantial amount of horticultural lighting reliant upon critical materials will be required 
(Griffin et al 2019). 
Price volatility is a measure of the changes in the price of commodities over a short period of 
time, and can result in many negative impacts to firms.  For example, an increase in the cost of 
goods sold (e.g. price of materials), a decrease in raw material and finished product supply (e.g. 
inventory on hand), a decrease in production efficiency (e.g. idle machine time), and a decrease 
in revenue due to lost sales.  Other problems include uncertainty in costs, product pricing, 
earnings, and credit availability, thus affecting the short-term profitability and long-term survival 
of firms (Agarwal, Ofori et al. 2012).  Specifically, price volatility negatively impacts margin, 
working capital, and share prices, with earnings shown to rise and fall as much as 10% to 30% 
(Agarwal, Ofori et al. 2012).   
Each of these financial metrics can provide valuable insight to a firm’s health and financial 
sustainability.  A firm’s margin represents the amount of money that it earns per sales dollar and 
is correlated to profit.  When margins decrease, profit may decrease as well.  At the product 
level, this may cause a firm to stop manufacturing a particular technology such as the more fuel-
efficient turbine blades used in GE’s jet engines or the more efficient and effective LED grow 
lights used in controlled environment agriculture.  A firm’s working capital represents the 
amount of cash and other short-term assets (e.g. accounts receivable), that it has available to pay 
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for operating expenses at any point in time.  Low working capital increases a firm’s financial 
risk.  If a manufacturing firm is faced with a price spike for a material that it relies on, the firm’s 
ability to service its short-term debt may be compromised.  If the impact persists, a decline in 
working capital could threaten the viability of a firm overall.  A firm’s share price is the amount 
of money that a person is willing to pay for the firm’s stock.  Changes in share price impact a 
firm’s ability to raise capital and are an indicator of the financial health of the organization.  A 
decrease in share price may cause a firm to cut costs in order to increase margins.  A firm might 
cut costs by abandoning certain products or through more invasive measures such as cutting 
funding for research and development. 
 
3.1.  Aviation Case Study 
The predominant driver of the price of rhenium is demand created by the aviation industry 
which relies on this material to achieve high-temperature properties in blades and vanes for high 
pressure aero and industrial gas turbine engines.  These turbines are in high demand because 
their ability to withstand extremely high temperatures enables increased performance and fuel 
efficiency in jet engines.  
Rhenium is an expensive metal with historical price volatility that is used in the manufacture 
of superalloys, catalysts, and gas-to-liquid (GTL) refinery processes (Polyak 2017).  It is a by-
product of copper ores with little to no direct mining, and approximately 80% of demand is met 
through primary production (MSP-REFRAM 2017).  Secondary rhenium provides the remaining 
supply and is produced mostly through foundry and mill scrap recycling, and recycling of parts 
from jet engines that have reached end of life (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010).  Estimated world 
reserves of rhenium are 11 kt of which 5 kt are found in the U.S. (John 2015).  Despite the 
considerable reserves of rhenium located in the U.S., a lack of production facilities drastically 
limits what can be supplied domestically (John 2015).  For example, in 2017, world production 
of rhenium was 52,000 kg.  Of the 42,600 kg consumed by the U.S. in the same year, 8,500 kg 
was mined in the U.S. which has a total of six mining operations: four in Arizona, one in 
Montana, and one in Utah (Polyak 2018).  
Most of the remaining 34,100 kg of rhenium consumed in the U.S. in 2017 was imported 
from Canada, Chile, Germany, Kazakhstan, and the Republic of Korea (Polyak 2018).  
Additional sources included Estonia, France, Japan, Poland, and Russia (Polyak 2018). Although 
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the United States currently has positive diplomatic relations with the majority of these countries, 
political conditions and trade policy are subject to change at any time.  Particularly in the context 
of sustainable technologies, should demand for materials like rhenium dramatically increase, 
tariffs could make imports unfeasible.  Foreign countries may also elect to stop exporting certain 
materials altogether.  China’s trade policies are of particular concern.  In 2017 China produced 
80% of the supply and accounted for more than 66% of global demand for rare earth elements, 
many of which are considered critical (GlobalData Energy 2018).  Mancheri et al argue that 
China’s influence on the resilience of the rare earth element supply chain is strong enough that 
trade policies affect China differently than they do the rest of the world (2019). 
The cost of rhenium is based on prices issued by the London-based Minor Metals Trade 
Association and long-term purchasing agreements between the consumer and producer (Lipmann 
2005).  Because rhenium operates in an opaque market—most transactions are made through 
long-term contracts that aren’t publicly recorded—it is susceptible to drastic and sudden price 
changes that are generally triggered by market speculation (Lipmann 2005, Polyak 2017).  For 
example, in 2008, strong demand triggered by speculation and sudden large orders for new 
generation aircraft—built with blade turbines requiring rhenium—led to a price spike in which 
the cost of rhenium reached $12,500/kg compared to a more typical cost in the range of 
$1,800/kg to $2,600/kg.  By the middle of 2009, the market corrected to a cost of $4,000/kg to 














Figure 3.1.1. Price Volatility of Rhenium, 1975 – 2017 (Polyak 2017, Polyak 2018) 
 
 
Although rhenium can be recycled from decommissioned gas turbines and catalytic 
converters, this secondary source does not necessarily relieve price pressure in the broader 
market because recycled rhenium has lower purity than rhenium derived directly from ore and 
therefore produces different technological results.  General Electric (GE), for example, initially 
touted the use of recycled rhenium as a demand (and therefore cost), reduction strategy in the 
wake of the 2008 price spike (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010).  Although possible from an engineering 
standpoint, the reduction and/or elimination of the use of rhenium in these engines was 
ultimately unviable because it resulted in decreased fuel efficiency (Duclos 2016).  GE is 
currently pursuing and finding success with the development and implementation of ceramic 
framework composites (Kellner 2017). 
The economic and strategic importance of rhenium in the aviation industry is evident in the 
cost of production.  The average amount of rhenium needed to manufacture engines for one 
commercial aircraft, such as Rolls-Royce’s Trent XWB, is 50kg (MSP-REFRAM).  The cost for 
this amount of rhenium at the all-time high 2008 price of $10,400 USD/kg would be $520,000 
USD per aircraft vs. $76,500 USD per aircraft at the 2017 price of $1,530 USD/kg, a decrease of 
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and the 2017 price of rhenium, the Trent XWB earns $5,215,000 USD per engine on a revenue 
and cost basis (plc 2018).  By comparison, the Trent XWB earns just $1,753,500 USD per engine 
at 2008 rhenium prices.  This is equal to a loss of -9.89% in gross margin, or $3,461,500 USD 
per engine.  Material fraction of total material cost, which provides an indication of the 
importance of a given material with regard to product functionality and value, also demonstrates 
the criticality of rhenium in aviation.  In this case, the amount of rhenium needed to produce one 
Trent XWB engine accounts for just 0.69% of the total dry engine weight of 7,277 kg (Agency 
2013).  At 2008 rhenium prices, the material fraction cost is equal to 1.99% versus 0.26% at 
2017 prices.  This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.2. 
Despite the suggested role of speculation in the 2008 rhenium price spike, it is important to 
note that the broader macroeconomic climate was also extremely volatile at this time.  The 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 resulted in a steep global recession in 2009 so, although the 
rhenium market did experience a market correction in 2009, real correlative relationships cannot 
be asserted between the cost of critical materials and firm profit based on this data alone.  The 
circumstances surrounding a similar price spike that occurred in 1980 mimic those of the 2008 
price spike.  The single-crystal nickel-based superalloys that rely on rhenium for their high creep 
strength were emerging in the early 1980s when U.S. economy also experienced a significant 


















Although this case study focuses on the example of one aircraft manufacturer, Rolls-Royce 
plc is not the only aerospace firm that relies on materials vulnerable to price spikes.  To further 
understand the dynamic between critical material price volatility and firm performance, annual 
and quarterly data was analyzed for three additional aircraft manufacturing firms that rely 
heavily on rhenium: Boeing, General Electric (GE), and Pratt & Whitney (a subsidiary of United 
Technologies).  This information is available in Appendix D. 
 
3.2. Controlled Environment Agriculture 
Controlled environment agriculture (CEA) is a form of urban agriculture that relies 
exclusively on artificial lighting (i.e., sole source lighting), for plant production.  The reason 
CEA firms should care about critical materials is that the three primary types of horticultural 
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emitting diode (LED)—all rely on critical materials.  Critical materials are minerals and metals 
that are vulnerable to supply disruptions and high in economic or strategic importance.  In the 
case of CEA, critical materials are important because they impact some of the specific 
characteristics of artificial lighting technologies that make crops successful or not. 
This case focuses on LED lighting because, although these horticultural grow lamps are the 
most expensive, they are also the most energy efficient and have the longest lifespan.  To 
manufacture LED grow lights requires critical materials such as cerium, europium, gadolinium, 
gallium, indium, and yttrium. These materials determine the spectrum (i.e., color), of light 
emitted by any given light bulb (Buchert et al 2012). Because plants require light from specific 
wavelengths on the light spectrum (Runkle 2015), the utility of any artificial lighting used in 
plant production is dependent on the material composition of the light bulbs being used.  For 
example, yttrium, gadolinium, and cerium are commonly used to produce yellow hued light 
versus europium which is integral for producing red light (Buchert et al 2010). This is 
particularly relevant to LED lighting because this technology can be customized to emit the 
spectrum of light required at different plant growth stages and by different crop types in order to 
optimize yield.  
There are six critical materials included in the controlled environment agriculture case.  
These include gallium, indium, and four rare earth elements (cerium, europium, gadolinium, and 
yttrium).   
• Gallium is a metal used primarily for semiconductors, LEDs, and PV components.  
Primary deposits of gallium are found in Australia, China, Brazil, and India. Annual 
production capacity is 180 metric tons per year versus a recycling capacity of 200 metric 
tons per year worldwide (Jaskula 2019). However, the stated recycling capacity includes 
material that is not economically viable to recover (Jaskula 2019).  United States 
consumption of gallium was equal to an estimated 23 metric tons in 2018 (Jaskula 2019). 
• Indium is a metal used in the production of infrared detectors, high-speed transistors, PV 
cells, and LEDs.  Most often derived as a byproduct of zinc ores, primary sources of 
indium can be found in China, Peru, Canada, Australia, and the United States.  In 2010, 
primary global indium production was 570 metric tons (Anderson 2019).  United States 
consumption of indium was an estimated 170 metric tons in 2018 (Anderson 2019). 
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• Rare Earth Elements are a group of 17 elements that share similar properties, and are 
comprised of the 15 lanthanides, scandium, and yttrium (Gambogi 2019a, Gambogi 
2019b).  They are produced almost exclusively by China where 97% of rare earth mining 
and concentration occurs (Gambogi 2019a, Gambogi 2019b).  Of particular note is the 
fact that 80% of the world’s supply of phosphors used for lighting technologies is 
consumed by China (Gambogi 2019a, Gambogi 2019b).  The following four rare earth 
elements are commonly used in LED lighting (Gambogi 2019a, Gambogi 2019b). 
o Cerium is a metal used for a wide variety of applications including nuclear 
technologies, pigments, ceramics, metallurgical alloys, catalysts, glass and 
polishing, and phosphors such as those used in LED lighting. 
o Europium is a metal used in the production of nuclear technologies, defense 
technologies, ceramics, and phosphors such as those used in LED lighting. 
o Gadolinium is a metal used in nuclear technologies, ceramics, glass and polishing, 
and phosphors such as those used in LED lighting. 
o Yttrium is a metal used in the production of nuclear technologies, defense 
technologies, ceramics, metallurgical alloys, and phosphors such as those used in 
LED lighting. 
Production and consumption of rare earth elements is reported in aggregate with the 
exception of yttrium.  In 2017, China reported production of 180,000 metric tons of rare-
earth-oxide equivalent (Gambogi 2019a).  Although the United States did not produce 
any rare earth elements in 2017, it did produce 15,000 metric tons in 2018 (Gambogi 
2019a).  The only other country with mine production above 2,600 metric tons per year is 
Australia which produced 19,000 metric tons in 2017 and 20,000 metric tons in 2018 
(Gambogi 2019a).  United States consumption of rare earth elements was estimated at 
9,500 metric tons in 2018 (Gambogi 2019a).  In addition to the other 16 rare earth 
elements, China is also the dominant producer of yttrium (Gambogi 2019b).  In 2018 
China produced an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 metric tons of yttrium (Gambogi 2019b). 
Domestic consumption of yttrium was estimated to be 400 metric tons in 2018 (Gambogi 
2019b). 
Supply dynamics similar to those discussed with regard to rhenium and the aviation industry 
are relevant to the six critical materials being discussed in the context of horticultural LED 
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lighting and controlled environment agriculture.  This includes a reliance on effective diplomacy 
between the United States and important producers like China.  It also includes dependence on 
the political conditions and trade policies of producing countries as well as the consumption 
patterns of those same countries.  In terms of cost and pricing, all six critical materials are traded 
in an opaque market, as is the case for rhenium.  In depth current and historical pricing data is 
not publicly available but rather must be obtained directly from buyers and sellers, or from 
information brokers such as the Shanghai Metals Market (SMM Information & Technology Co, 
Ltd). The cost of rare earth elements in particular is largely controlled by China.  In fact, rare 
earth price spikes in 2010 and 2011 have been attributed to China’s decision to cut its export 
allowances (GlobalData Energy 2018).  Complicating the situation is the current trade war 
between the United States and China through which tariffs are compromising trade relations 
(GlobalData Energy 2018).     
The economic and strategic importance of the critical materials (e.g., cerium, europium, 
gadolinium, gallium, indium, and yttrium), used in horticultural LED lighting is evident in 
market demand.  Compared to rhenium, which has concentrated demand from the aviation 
industry, the critical materials needed to manufacture horticultural lighting are also used for 
numerous other technologies with strategic and/or economic importance.  Some of these are 
listed in Table 3.2.1.  LED lighting designed for horticultural applications is especially 
vulnerable to competing demand for the required critical materials.  The reason for this is that 
LEDs are low cost, high efficiency, have myriad uses, and are being rapidly adopted. For 
example, the number of household installations of LED bulbs in 2014 was 195 times that of 2009 
(DOE 2016).  Between 2008 and 2016, the price of a typical household LED bulb dropped by 














Cerium LFL, LED Nuclear, pigments, ceramics, metallurgical alloys, catalysts, 
glass and polishing, phosphors 
Europium LFL, LED Nuclear, defense, ceramics, phosphors 
Gadolinium LED Nuclear, ceramics, phosphors, glass and polishing 
Gallium LED Semiconductors, LEDs, PV components 
Indium LED Infrared detectors, high-speed transistors, PV cells 
Yttrium LFL, LED Nuclear, defense, ceramics, metallurgical alloys, phosphors 
 
LED horticultural lighting is in high demand due to the growth of indoor farming (Agrilyst et 
al 2017).  The expansion of controlled environment agriculture in particular is driven by 
declining outdoor growing conditions related to climate change and increased urbanization.   
Increased strain and pressure on water resources, an increase in the occurrence and extremity of 
severe weather events, and increased temperature are just some of the ways that climate change 
is making it more difficult to grow food using conventional, open field methods.  Second, as 
more and more people move to urban areas it will become less efficient to produce food in rural 
areas far from population centers (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
2017).  The transportation, distribution, and logistics involved will become more expensive and 
generate more emissions.  In other words, the strategic and economic importance of the critical 
materials required to manufacture the lighting necessary for controlled environment agriculture 
is simply the ability to produce enough food to feed the world population.  
As in the aviation case, horticultural lighting manufacturers rely on materials vulnerable to 
price spikes.  Figure 3.2.1. shows the gross margin of a leading LED manufacturer, CREE, 
before and since the price spike in rare earth elements that occurred around 2010.  Rare earth 
elements are used to manufacture horticultural lighting technologies and have very few or no 
substitutes.  Figure 3.2.2. shows CREE’s gross margin along with the price of Gallium, which is 






Figure 3.2.1 Annual Financial Performance of CREE vs. Price of Rare Earth Elements 
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In the aviation case, manufacturers are vulnerable to criticality fallout primarily due to the 
extremely long process of manufacturing aircraft. Agreements about the number of aircraft to be 
purchased at what price are contracted years ahead of actual production, and the fulfillment of 
orders can occur over a period of years (Lipmann 2005, Polyak 2017).  This makes it very 
unlikely that increased costs due to price volatility and supply disruptions can be passed on to the 
consumer. In the horticultural lighting case, manufacturers are similarly vulnerable but for 
different reasons.  Despite having the benefit of dramatically shorter production times, lighting 
manufacturers face an extremely competitive market, the wide availability of many substitutes 
(e.g., by technology or brand), and are forced to absorb any price spikes due to price competition 
(CREE 2018).   
Going back at least as far as the year 2000, CREE has commented on supply risk in its SEC 
10-K filings.  The company notes, in reference to sources of raw materials, that it depends on 
“certain key materials and equipment used in critical stages of our manufacturing process” and 
that its suppliers “can be subject to many constraints limiting supply that are beyond our control” 
(CREE 2000-2018).  The company also states that it is reliant on sole or limited source suppliers 
and that, although alternate suppliers exist, the process of vetting them can take six months or 
longer.  Finally, CREE notes the difficulty and additional cost associated with obtaining certain 
raw materials that are concentrated in conflict zones and therefore subject to transparency and 
accountability regulations enforced by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (CREE 2012).  As recently as 2017, CREE noted in its SEC 10-K that many of 
the raw materials required to manufacture its products are prone to high price volatility as well as 
variation in consistency and availability. 
There are clear advantages and disadvantages to each of the three primary horticultural 
lighting technologies that differently impact their vulnerability to critical material risk.  For 
example, the critical material requirement for fluorescent bulbs is considerably lower in mass 
and cost compared to HID and LED bulbs (see Table 7.3.1. in Appendix C).  However, supply 
disruptions and price volatility have somewhat of an equalizing effect on the three technologies.  
The cost and availability of critical materials becomes irrelevant when neither manufacturers nor 
business consumers can absorb or compensate for the financial impact.  For example, if HID, 
fluorescent, and LED lighting were simultaneously unavailable and/or unaffordable, 
manufacturers might resort to producing the comparatively inefficient and ineffective technology 
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of incandescent bulbs to grow plants.  However, even that technology relies on critical materials.  
The filaments and lead wires are made of tungsten.  Rolls-Royce can continue to produce jet 
engines without rhenium; these engines won’t be as fuel efficient as the Trent XWB, but they 
will effectively power aircraft. Horticultural lighting capable of emitting specific spectrums of 
light, on the other hand, can’t be manufactured without critical materials like tungsten, cerium, 
europium, gallium and yttrium. 
The critical material risk to horticultural lighting manufacturing has multiple implications 
beyond the firm.  For example, assume that a significant percentage of agriculture has shifted to 
controlled environment methods.  If horticultural lighting manufacturing becomes limited, 
unpredictable, or too costly, how does food get produced?  Each type of light bulb—HID, 
fluorescent, and LED—has a lifespan ranging between 6 and 14 years depending on the 
technology and usage.  This means that the impact of a critical material supply disruption would 
lag significantly, assuming that currently deployed horticultural lighting varies in remaining 
useful lifespan.  However, there are additional factors at play.  For example, using LED lighting 
and indoor farming on a large scale may require more materials than are produced in a given 
year. Another mitigating factor might be trade policy.  The vast majority of the critical materials 
used in horticultural lighting are produced in China. Although many of the critical materials used 
in horticultural lighting can be reclaimed from light bulbs at end of life, it is not yet clear that this 
strategy is efficient or economically feasible (Rhee et al 2013, Punkkinen et al 2017, Rahman et 
al 2017). With limited and often no production capacity in the United States, a supply disruption 
and/or price spike could theoretically last indefinitely.   
 
3.3. Firm Response: Supply Disruption Profile 
It is unlikely that firms will be able to prevent critical material supply disruptions altogether 
so their response to them when they occur is important.  Figure 3.3.1. is an adaptation of a supply 
chain disruption profile developed by Sheffi and Rice (2005).  It depicts changes to firm 
performance relative to a supply disruption and mitigation tactics over time, and includes several 
of the mitigation strategies such as hedging, substitution, and development of new materials and 
technologies.  It may be surprising, but even firms that have long-term contracts in place for 
commodities can still experience delays in delivery of that commodity due to disruptions. Nokia 
had large losses due to a disruption in delivery of semiconductor devices that was caused by a 
 34 
supplier fire (a supplier that had long-term price contracts) (When the chain breaks 2006).  
General Electric also had long-term contracts in place for rhenium; these agreements may not 
always ensure commodity delivery when actual physical disruptions occur (Duclos 2016). Firms 
are then forced to get the commodity, part, or product from a different supplier that they do not 
have long-term contracts with and thus are forced to pay a much higher price.  
Although the trajectory of the response shown assumes that the firm was engaged to some 
extent in hedging, we can clearly see that once the benefits of hedging have been depleted (i.e. 
short term inventory and alternate suppliers), the time to recovery and normalization is about 
three times as long as the time between the disruption and the use of short term solutions.  One 
way that the profile is instructive on the goal of firm-level criticality assessment (i.e. to mitigate 
and/or prevent a negative impact on firm performance due to supply disruption), is to apply the 
scenario in Figure 3.1.2.  For example, if Rolls-Royce had proactively identified substitutes or 
developed new materials and technologies in place of rhenium, these mitigation tactics could 
have been implemented directly following the assessment phase of the response, thereby 
substantially reducing the drop in firm performance and its duration. 
Figure 3.3.1. Conceptual Timeline of Firm Response to Supply Disruption 
 
A number of additional insights and conclusions can also be drawn from the disruption 
profile.  First, firm performance relative to a supply disruption appears to be correlated to time.  
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Second, the severity of the disruption’s impact varies throughout the profile suggesting that 
interim firm actions are correlated to that firm’s progression through the profile.  Third, the time 
from the disruptive event to recovery, as well as the time between stages, is contingent on a 
firm’s actions.  In other words, although supply disruptions create predictable impacts across 
organizations, an individual firm’s response determines the ultimate outcome. This means that 
firm-level risk monitoring and mitigation is not only possible, but necessary. 
Some of the ways that individual manufacturing firms can moderate the risk of critical 
material supply disruption involve material usage, product development, product design, and 
inventory management.  For example, a firm might use one alloy in place of another, develop an 
entirely new alloy, reduce waste through increased materialization, or decrease the amount of 
material needed by increasing material efficiency.  Another strategy might be cross-functional 
collaboration during product development; at least some of the information needed to assess 
criticality from the development stage is often located outside of R&D, so involving engineering 
and procurement experts can make a determination of viability more efficient and prevent long-
term risk.  A third approach to risk mitigation is to design products that accommodate efficient 
extraction of critical materials at end-of-life and create mechanisms to maximize end-of-life 
material recovery.  Inventory management strategies could include the use of long-term supply 
contracts, hedging, and supplier transparency.  Large firms might also use vertical integration to 
acquire their suppliers or secure a primary source of material through mining rights and smelting 
plants (Cullbrand and Magnusson 2012).  Vertical integration is a supply chain strategy and 
business model that firms use to gain more control over the inputs of production.  Instead of 
using third-party suppliers to secure materials, firms with an integrated supply chain own the 
companies that provide the materials needed.   
The success of these strategies depends on two things: associated costs (in terms of product 
quality, product efficacy, and financial expense), and timeliness of implementation.  In the 
former case, a firm may have a substitute material available that is feasible but results in a lower 
durability; an alternate material that meets minimum requirements but results in lower 
performance; or the technological ability to extract a critical material from a product that has 
reached end of life that is not economical.  In the latter case, a firm may complete a product 
redesign (which eliminates the need for critical material), only after it has lost most of its market 
share due to a supply disruption.   
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General Electric (GE) provides a real-world example of firm-level risk mitigation that found 
success in terms of timely implementation but not cost.  When confronted with a perceived 
shortage of rhenium (a material critical to the manufacture of turbine engines), GE’s aviation 
segment used a multiple step internal strategy to address the impact of an externally driven 
supply disruption (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010).  Below, we use GE’s strategy and the disruption 
profile from Sheffi and Rice to demonstrate the firm-level impact and response (Sheffi and Rice 
Jr 2005).   
The first action taken by GE took place before the rhenium shortage occurred, corresponding 
with the preparation stage of the disruption profile.  By examining each material that it deemed 
critical to its operations, GE was then able to evaluate each material based on four sub-risks: GE 
% of world supply, impact on GE revenue, ability to use substitute materials, and ability to pass 
through cost increases to consumers.  Each of these sub-risks can be quantified and tracked using 
internal data.  Once known, additional preventive action can be taken such as hedging, securing 
long-term supply agreements, material stockpiling, redesigning products to decrease material 
utilization, and developing new technology that requires no or fewer critical materials. 
After the disruptive event occurred (i.e. the perceived rhenium shortage), GE conducted a 
material usage audit that was then used to determine sources and sinks of rhenium in the 
products being manufactured.  This corresponds with the first response stage of the disruption 
profile and it enabled GE to fully assess its ability to internally mitigate the risk at hand. Next, 
although GE couldn’t control the initial impact of the disruption, they could take steps to move 
toward the recovery stage of the disruption profile. Beginning with the initial impact stage and 
through the time of the full impact and preparation for recovery stages, GE took four actions 
based on its assessment in the third stage of the disruption profile.  First, GE employed a 
common foundry practice called revert which allowed them to reuse casting waste.  Second, GE 
developed a chemical process that enabled them to reuse grinding chips of rhenium for high 
value alloys.  Third, GE developed a cleaning process to recycle material from products that 
have reached end of life.  Finally, GE developed two new alloys that require significantly less 
rhenium content.   
Having successfully reduced rhenium usage, GE entered the recovery stage.  Based on the 
information available, it’s difficult to gauge the long-term impact of the rhenium supply 
disruption to GE but two conclusions can be drawn.  First, although the turbine engines 
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manufactured with the new alloys developed during the recovery phase of the supply disruption 
did successfully operate, they were ultimately unviable from a business standpoint because the 
reduction of rhenium resulted in decreased fuel efficiency (Duclos 2016).  Second, despite the 
market failure of the new alloys, GE was still able to mitigate risk by using internal data and 
resources to minimize material waste and increase utilization efficiency. 
 
3.4. The Bullwhip Effect 
In addition to understanding the mechanics of a supply disruption over the course of its 
impact on an individual firm, broader market dynamics must be considered.  One important 
example of this is the supply chain and its many interdependencies, as illustrated by the bullwhip 
effect.  A phenomenon in which inventory levels get out of sync with demand, the bullwhip 
effect causes companies to over- or under-order from suppliers, and results in artificially 
amplified demand over time.  The underlying disconnect between buyers and sellers throughout 
the supply chain leads to increasing operational inefficiencies such as excess inventory, lack of 
inventory, lost production time, lost sales, and, ultimately, lost profit and market share.   
Lee et al. have identified four underlying mechanisms that cause the bullwhip effect: demand 
forecast updating, order batching, price fluctuation, and rationing and shortage gaming (Lee, 
Padmanabhan et al. 1997a, Lee, Padmanabhan et al. 1997b).  Demand forecast updating is a 
process in which firms determine future operational needs (e.g. materials, capacity, production 
scheduling), based on historical sales.  When a firm places an order based on this information, 
the next level of the supply chain bases its production, including safety stock, on that signal.  
Order batching happens when firms order periodically rather than based explicitly on demand 
and when firms experience surges in demand (e.g. a new product is more popular than 
forecasted).  Rationing happens when demand exceeds supply and producers ration their 
products in response.  Shortage gaming is when customers exaggerate their orders to compensate 
for rationing.  
The triggering event of the bullwhip effect is an increase in demand at the downstream end of 
the supply chain (in this case, aircraft orders from airlines).  Represented by the yellow line in 
the conceptual model in Figure 3.4.1., inventory levels begin to diverge after a modest increase 
in demand at the retail level followed by increasing amplification further up the supply chain.  
The retail inventory and backorder quantities fluctuate the least followed by the wholesale level, 
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the distributor level, and finally the factory level.  The areas of the graph in which some levels of 
the supply chain have positive inventory levels, and some have backorders highlight potential 
areas for supply disruption.  For example, in the middle of the graph, the factory backlog is 
extremely high and all other supply chain actors are reducing their backlogs.  In response, both 
the factory and the distributor next develop safety stocks that far surpass subsequent inventory 
levels at the wholesaler and retailer levels of the supply chain.  These fluctuations and 
mismatches across supply chain actors result in inefficiencies that threaten a firm’s stability such 
as higher raw material costs, carrying costs due to excess inventory, increased labor costs due to 
overtime needed to fill overdue orders, and poor customer service.   
 
Figure 3.4.1. Bullwhip Effect Conceptual Model 
 
 
The relevance of the bullwhip effect to firms that rely on critical materials, and therefore 
often face supply disruptions, is an increase in the degree of uncertainty in risk measurement.  













on time orders to late orders), zero-replenishment (i.e. the absence of orders from a tier in the 
supply chain during a regular order period), and slope metrics (i.e. bullwhip slope, inventory 
instability slope, and work in process instability slope), to mitigate risk in their own inventory 
and supply levels, but they have to rely on market signals to measure this same risk beyond the 
first tier in their supply chain (Cannella, Barbosa-Póvoa et al. 2013).  This means that when the 
supply chain experiences a bullwhip, each tier of the supply chain is faced with this same 
dilemma, and the degree of uncertainty in risk measurement increases with each tier. 
Figure 3.4.2. illustrates two of these key parameters for firms that greatly influence the 
impact on them in the face of a supply disruption.  The bullwhip effect can be illustrated by the 
order penetration point, i.e., where in a typical process the firm lies in terms of delivering its 
product.  In the aerospace examples, those firms design to order and are therefore at the highest 
order penetration point.  In comparison, most consumer products and electronics are made to be 
shipped directly to customers and have a low order penetration point (to the right on the Figure).  
On the y-axis is the reliance of the industry on materials as it relates to profitability.  Both 
aerospace and the automotive industry for example, rely heavily on material price margins in 
order to deliver on profitability.  One can see that the aerospace case is therefore somewhat of an 















Figure 3.4.2. Example order penetration point and reliance on materials for various industries 

















3.5. Firm-Level Indicators and Criticality Assessment Framework for Firms 
A comprehensive set of indicators spanning six broad categories (i.e. demand risk, 
environmental risk, geopolitical risk, market risk, scarcity, and supply chain), was identified in 
our analysis of existing firm-level criticality assessment methods.  In general, these indicators 
were distributed fairly evenly as shown in Figure 3.5.1., with the highest percentage of indicators 
being found in the Market Risk category.  Although these indicators incorporate all three of the 
core facets of sustainability (i.e. social, environmental, and financial), only 18% of them can be 
considered internal indicators, meaning that they can be derived from data generated at the firm 
level.  Conversely, 82% of the indicators found can be characterized as external indicators.  This 
finding is consistent with our assertion that current criticality assessments rely primarily on 
external data.  Although external indicators—such as investment in mining, static reach reserves, 
and sourcing and geopolitical risk—are important and pertinent to criticality assessment at all 
levels, they can rarely be influenced by individual firms.   




















In order to address the gap in firm-level criticality assessment methods, we further analyzed 
our findings and identified four sub-categories of internal indicators among the 11 firm-level 
studies reviewed: business risk, substitutability, supplier risk, and supply.  As shown in Figure 
3.5.1., 14 indicators concern business risk, 1 concerns substitutability, 1 concerns supplier risk, 
and 1 concerns supply.  This is instructive because it gives an indication of what data and metrics 
are important and relevant to individual firms.  For example, all of the business risk indicators 
fall into the broader category of market risk which is a determinant of the market viability of 
products.   
 
Figure 3.5.1. Firm-Level Indicators by Category & Sub-Category 
 
As a first step toward developing a criticality framework designed specifically for use at the 
firm level, five key components of assessment were identified: business purpose, application, 
























Each of these components reflects assessment approaches and trends across the 11 firm-level 
studies.  For instance, all of the firm-level studies incorporated metrics, risk levels, and 
indicators.  Specific assessment themes found in the existing firm-level studies that were 
incorporated into the framework developed through this research include the treatment of risk, 
business performance, substitutability, and product-based risk assessment.  For example, 
multiple studies employed unprescribed risk levels and control limits, and thresholds defined by 
individual firms.  Risk was often categorized qualitatively (e.g., very high, high, medium, low, 
very low), and correlated to firm-determined control limits and thresholds that could be 
qualitative (e.g., concentrated, high risk, some diversity and/or risk, U.S. based), or quantitative 
(e.g., < 50%, 50% - 100%, 200% - 500%, >500%) (Duclos 2016, Rosenau-Tornow et al 2009, 
Lloyd et al 2012a).  Indicators were used to directly relate criticality risk to business performance 
(e.g., impact on revenue, ability to pass through cost increases, demand risk) (Duclos 2016, 
Lloyd et al 2012a, Lloyd et al 2012b, Miehe et al 2016, Kolotzek 2018).  Rather than relying 
solely on supplier metrics (e.g., number of suppliers available), some studies incorporated 
metrics for substitutability in order to assess alternatives that firms have more control of and 
better access to (Duclos 2016, Lloyd et al 2012a, Kolotzek 2018).  Product-based risk assessment 
was an approach used by four studies to understand risk exposure based on unit cost and revenue 
(Duclos 2016, Lloyd et al 2012b, Miehe et al 2016, Kolotzek 2018).  
 





Using product viability in the context of market risk as a starting point, the emphasis of our 
assessment framework is definitively on a firm-level scope rather than a market, industry, 
national, or global one.  The indicators themselves are correlated to three key functions present 
in any firm: profitability, design and product concept viability, and production.  Each of these 
business elements has organization-wide impact and relies on resources and processes from 
multiple areas across a firm.  In addition, vulnerability in one or more of these areas can 
constitute a threat to business sustainability.  The purpose of this design is to produce 
information that has universal relevance to firms, a connection to the fundamental tenets of 
business noted above, a representation of cross-functional organizational dynamics (i.e. finance, 
procurement, marketing, and production), and the availability and accessibility of the underlying 
data in the regular course of business (Griffin et al 2019).  A list of the specific indicators is 
presented in Table 3.5.1.  
 
Table 3.5.1. Criticality Indicators 
Profitability  
 Indicator Definition Relevance 
Finance Revenue  Income from sales of products 
relying on critical material 
An indicator of risk exposure relative 
to products that do not require critical 
material 
Procurement Price Volatility The percentage difference in the 
price of a material over a given 
period of time 
An indicator of market stability; high 
levels of volatility signal high levels of 
uncertainty and risk 
Marketing Price Elasticity The ratio of percentage change in 
quantity demanded to percentage 
change in price 
An indicator of the responsiveness of 
demand to changes in price; changes 
in price that don’t impact demand are 
inelastic vs. changes in price that do 
impact demand which are elastic  
Production Substitutability 
 
The extent to which it is possible to 
substitute another material for a 
critical material 
Higher substitutability allows firms to 
use alternative materials when faced 
with supply disruptions due either to 









Design & Product Concept Viability  
 Indicator Definition Relevance 
Finance Material Fraction 
of Total Material 
Cost 
Percentage of total product cost 
from critical materials  
Indicator used to evaluate the 
importance of a given critical material 
with regard to product functionality 
and value 
Procurement Supplier Risk Availability of suppliers with 
limited conduct violations 
If publicized, use of suppliers with 
poor conduct can threaten the viability 
of an entire firm 
Marketing Segment Market 
Share 
Percentage of total sales in a given 
market segment 
Market share is an indicator of relative 




Ratio of the raw material weight 
used in production to the weight of 
the finished product 
An indicator of material waste; higher 





 Indicator Definition Relevance 
Finance Gross Margin Percentage of revenue retained as 
gross profit 
The higher the percentage, the more 
sales dollars retained which can be 
used to cover costs and service debts; 
a measure of organizational stability 
Procurement Inventory 
Variance Ratio 
Ratio between inventory variance 
magnitude and demand variance 
ratio 
A quantification of inventory 
fluctuation that signals changes in 
holding and backlog costs, and can be 
used to measure inflated average 
inventory cost per period; higher 




The percentage of deliveries that are 
on time and complete orders 
Production delays due to raw material 
delay can be extremely expensive 
Production Production 
Efficiency 
Ability to produce the highest 
quantity with the least resources at 
the lowest cost and the highest 
profit 
A decrease in production efficiency 
could signal a supply problem  
 
Combined with the indicators, the framework also reflects findings from each of the case 
studies presented in this work.  In the aviation case, the concurrence observed between firm 
performance and the price volatility of rhenium informed three of the indicators included our 
framework: revenue, price volatility, and gross margin.  Analysis of price volatility informed 
another indicator, material fraction of total material cost.  In the controlled environment 
agriculture (CEA) case, concurrence was again observed between price volatility and firm 
performance.  However, in the CEA case, impacts to firm performance were in terms of not just 
profitability but of product viability.   
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In the aviation case, the impact of a rhenium supply disruption does not immediately threaten 
production because manufacturers do have access to substitute materials and because the 
material fraction of total cost is quite low.  This means that, although the manufacturer may incur 
a higher cost of production, production itself is not immediately vulnerable.  This is also related 
to the fact that aircraft manufacturing is a niche market with extremely long lead times.  
Switching costs are very high once a purchasing contract has been executed and there are very 
few competitors in the market.  Using substitutes decreases engine efficiency and performance 
but does not compromise the overall integrity of the product.   
In the CEA case, on the other hand, supply disruptions threaten production more quickly and 
more severely.  There are two reasons for this.  First, the lighting industry is low margin and 
extremely competitive.  There are many manufacturers and switching costs are low. Second, if 
substitute materials are used to manufacture horticultural LED lamps, the characteristics of the 
light that they emit can be substantively altered.  Given the highly customized nature of 
horticultural LED lamps (which is part and parcel of their value proposition), if there is a critical 
material supply disruption or price spike, consumers will be quickly incented to purchase an 
alternative, less expensive technology.  However, in the form presented in Table 3.5.1., this set 
of internal indicators does not stand alone.  So why would a firm want to use this tool?   
A fundamental characteristic of the indicators is that it does not specify the scope of 
criticality or risk to be measured.  Each firm has unique needs and circumstances (e.g., firm size, 
segment, industry, type, and number of products).  In designing the tool with limited structure, it 
can be used to focus on a specific raw material; a particular product or group of products; 
product or segment profitability; sales volume; research and development; or other priorities. In 
this way, the tool addresses inter and intra firm variability and can be uniquely adopted by any 
organization.  Given its underlying function—to assess criticality risk—the most important 
flexible aspect of the tool is the lack of defined risk limits.  The reason firms need a firm-level 
assessment methodology that relies on internal data is that the existing criticality assessment 
frameworks measure aggregate risk that does not take into account firm-specific parameters such 
as working capital, number of suppliers, labor available, specificity limits (i.e., process and 
product performance targets), and control limits (i.e., allowable performance variation).  This 
tool enables a firm to set unique control limits on degrees of risk and establish indicator bounds 
that reflect its specific circumstances, priorities, and strategies (Griffin et al 2019).   
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Defining criticality risk based on internal conditions using internal metrics represents the 
ultimate utility of the tool.  When the value of an internal indicator changes from one reporting 
period to another, firms can mitigate (or capitalize) on it through internal action.  When external 
factors impact an individual firm, the only course of action is to react.  For example, if a firm 
identifies a decrease in supplier reliability it can investigate this signal to determine if the cause 
lies with a specific supplier or if the change is a harbinger of broader supply chain delays.  
Similarly, if a firm determines that substitutability is low for a particular product group of 
products, it might try to develop its own substitute material or diversify its product offerings to 
include products with high substitutability. 
The tool can also be used to help firms strategically manage unforeseen negative events (i.e. 
Black Swans).  When a firm defines control limits and risk thresholds specific to its own 
operations (rather than national or global criteria), it can not only measure variability, but 
benchmark variability against its own limits.  In so doing, the firm can characterize a supply 
disruption in terms of the appropriate response.  When firms experience variations that are within 
control limits, they can revise risk thresholds to improve signaling.  When firms experience 
variations that are beyond control limits, there is a bigger problem.  An example of the difference 
between variations within and beyond control limits is a delay in shipment versus a price spike.  
If production slows or target delivery dates are compromised because a critical material is 
temporarily unavailable, variation is within control limits and a firm can likely survive the 
disruption.  If the cost of a critical material suddenly and unexpectedly increases dramatically, 
variation is beyond control limits and a firm may not survive the disruption.  The framework 
developed here is meant to address this variability so that it can be uniquely adopted by any 
organization. It also aims to provide an approach to criticality assessment that can be distilled 
into a firm-level scorecard that can be used to track and predict risk.  An example of what a firm-
level scorecard might look like is presented in Table 6.4. in Appendix B (Griffin et al 2019). 
More specifically, the framework can be implemented starting with just one material, 
product, or segment of focus.  The next step would be for the firm to identify sources of data and 
any related parameters from existing internal reporting.  For example, revenue from the material, 
product, or segment being analyzed as a percentage of total firm revenue could come from 
marketing, sales, or finance.  Given this information, a firm should next define risk thresholds 
and control limits.  For example, if revenue drops by X%, the firm will stop its production.  
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Similarly, a high level of risk might be defined as a decrease in revenue of Y% compared to a 
moderate level of risk which is defined as no change in revenue, or a low level of risk which is 
defined as Z% increase in revenue (Griffin et al 2019). 
In general, the risk levels defined by each firm are most useful when they correspond to a 
range of quantitative metrics.  This is important because the risk level and underlying ranges of 
values represent another way that firms can operationalize the framework to suit their individual 
needs.  For example, the dispersion of supplier reliability values may be wider for a firm with 
readily accessible secondary suppliers compared to a firm with only one supplier for a particular 
material or component.  Similarly, a firm that relies on a critical material for 5% of its revenue 
has more relaxed constraints compared to a firm that relies on a critical material for 50% of its 
revenue.   
A further consideration regarding criticality risk assessment is the relationship between the 
indicator and the timing of the decision(s) that it informs.  Generally, business performance 
management consists of both leading and lagging indicators.  Leading indicators are predictive in 
nature in that they are meant to inform decisions that precede an economic impact or change.  
They are also a crucial element of an efficient and effective framework. For example, 
substitutability—the extent to which it is possible to substitute another material for a critical 
material—is something that can be evaluated prior to a supply disruption.  If there is a high level 
of substitutability, supply disruption risk is low, and a firm can expect to be able to effectively 
manage such an occurrence by simply using an alternative, readily available material.  In this 
case the firm may decide to start or continue production of a technology involving critical 
materials.  If there is a low level of substitutability, a firm can use this information to make 
decisions about whether it will manufacture a product at all and, if so, what kind of commitments 
it will make to its clients (e.g. number of products manufactured per period), and how much 
margin it is willing to absorb if a supply disruption increases the cost of delivery to the client.  
Conversely, lagging indicators are meant to inform decisions that follow an economic impact and 
to substantiate trends and patterns.  For example, price volatility—the percentage difference in 
the price of a material over a given period of time—is an indicator of market stability.  By 
monitoring price volatility, a firm can make decisions about which products to produce when and 
in what quantities, based on the levels of uncertainty and risk reflected in historical data (Griffin 
et al 2019).   
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While there is latitude with regard to how a given organization can implement the firm-level 
criticality framework, there are a number of considerations to be made.  First, although historical 
trends may be useful in understanding and assessing criticality, the framework is designed to be 
used on a more dynamic basis.  For instance, the use of internal metrics (which are generated and 
available in the normal course of business), is intended to shorten the time between data 
generation and criticality assessment in order to improve the timeliness of firm response to a 
predicted or observed supply disruption.  The framework should be updated quarterly at a 
minimum.  This time period was chosen for a number of reasons: it is a common reporting 
period, annual data may no longer be relevant by the time it is available, and correlation can be 
seen on a quarterly basis. Second, the framework can and should be used to inform a firm’s 
mitigation strategy choices.  For example, the price volatility metric can be used in combination 
with the material fraction of product cost and price elasticity to determine whether a firm should 
invest resources to redesign a particular product or simply maintain modest safety stock.  
Similarly, a firm could use segment market share and supplier risk to negotiate long-term 
contracts with suppliers.  Finally, the framework is designed to leverage existing internal 
business data to give the firm information that it can use to directly influence internal outcomes.  
Although there are salient external factors and data sources related to material criticality, the 
focus here is on factors over which firms have some degree of control (Griffin et al).   
 
3.6. The Role of the Organization 
Critical material risk assessment and mitigation have been extensively studied from 
perspectives external to individual firms such as physical availability, geopolitical conflict, 
global demand, and environmental hazards (see Table 6.1. in Appendix B).  While relevant and 
impactful at the firm level, these factors are largely outside the control and influence of 
individual businesses.  Conversely, firms can influence internal factors (e.g. product allocation, 
capital expenditures, supply chain strategy, research and development investment), that drive 
their individual profitability, design and product concept viability, and production efficiency.  In 
fact, business organizations routinely compile data and prepare both internal and external reports 
to do so.  Some of these include quarterly and annual financial reports, legally mandated tax and 
SEC filings, accounting audits, and assurance audits.  It follows then that, conceptually, firms 
should be able to leverage existing data and reporting structures to assess criticality risk.  In 
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practice, however, there is little evidence of this approach.  One reason for this may be that, just 
as the impacts of supply disruptions effect areas across an organization, remedies are also 
influenced by multiple areas and therefore can’t be implemented by any one department or 
functional area alone.  That is, the organizational structure of a firm plays a central role in its 
ability or inability to assess and mitigate criticality risk.  
One practical demonstration of this dynamic is the dependency between research and 
development and procurement.  Without information from a firm’s research and development 
resources, procurement won’t be able to contract the correct quantities and types of materials.  
This is especially relevant when a firm is ready to scale up from a prototype (i.e., one unit) to full 
scale production (i.e., dozens, hundreds, thousands, or even millions of units) because of the 
significant increase in volume.   Without procurement, research and development won’t know 
what alternate materials are available in what quantities and at what cost, and they won’t know if 
procuring the necessary materials is possible or financially feasible.  Both of these scenarios 
limit a firm’s ability to effectively respond to a supply disruption.  The former situation could, 
for example, result in production delays and compromise profits.  Similarly, the latter situation 
could lead to the development of a new product that is cost prohibitive to implement at scale.   
Using the internal criticality indicators in Table 3.5.1., Table 3.6.1. provides several examples of 
the relationship between organizational structure and risk assessment in an individual firm. 
 
Table 3.6.1. Internal Criticality Indicator Data and Sources at the Firm Level 
Profitability 
Indicator Information Needed Source of Information Org. Position 
Revenue Products containing critical 
materials 
Research & Development Materials Engineer 
 # of units sold / sales volume Accounting and Finance Accountant 
 $ per unit, per product Marketing Marketing Manager 
Price Volatility Material pricing data over time Procurement Cost Estimator 
Supplier contracts Procurement Purchasing Agent 
Price Elasticity Sales volume Accounting and Finance Accountant 
Pricing data over time Procurement Cost Estimator 
Ability to pass on cost increase Marketing Market Research 
Analyst 
Substitutability Product material composition Research & Development Materials Engineer 
Change-order cycle time Production Industrial Engineer 
Technical feasibility of 
substitution 




Design & Product Concept Viability 
Indicator Information Needed Source of Information Org. Position 
Material Fraction of 
Total Material Cost 
Product material composition Research & Development Materials Engineer 
Cost of critical materials used Procurement Purchasing Agent 
Total cost of materials used Procurement Purchasing Agent 
Supplier Risk Number of suppliers Procurement Purchasing Manager 
Supplier contract details Procurement Purchasing Manager 
Lead time by supplier Procurement Purchasing Agent 
Segment Market 
Share 
Revenue per product / business 
unit 
Accounting and Finance Accountant 
Total segment revenue Marketing Market Research 
Analyst 
Sales volume Accounting and Finance Accountant 
Material Utilization Design specified composition Research & Development Materials Engineer 
Actual composition Production Industrial Engineer 
Ability to reclaim materials Research & Development Materials Engineer 





Indicator Information Needed Source of Information Org. Position  
Gross Margin Revenue Accounting and Finance Accountant 
Cost of goods sold Accounting and Finance Accountant 
Inventory Variance 
Ratio 
Fluctuations in net inventory Production Supply Chain 
Manager 
Fluctuations in demand Marketing Market Research 
Analyst 
Supplier Reliability Sales lost to supply issues Production Supply Chain 
Manager 
Rate of delivery delay / failure Procurement Purchasing Agent 
Production 
Efficiency 
# of goods produced / # of goods 
scheduled to be produced 
Production Production Manager 
Margin of goods produced / 
margin of goods scheduled to be 
produced 
Accounting and Finance Accountant 
Technical feasibility of 
substitution 
Research & Development Materials Engineer 
 
The information in Table 3.6.1. highlights the definitive challenge faced by firms contending 
with criticality assessment and mitigation: effective cross functional communication and 
collaboration.  Across 16 indicators in 3 primary business functions there are a minimum of 33 
types of information needed from 5 major functional areas and 11 organizational roles.  
Although some pieces of data are used for multiple indicators (e.g. sales volume, revenue, 
material pricing), only one of 16 indicators does not require information from at least two 
organizational positions.  Further complicating matters is variation in data units (e.g. 
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quantitative, qualitative, discrete, binary, ordinal, etc.), reporting baselines, and the timeliness of 
available information, all of which undermine the goal of criticality assessment and mitigation. 
A comprehensive assessment of a firm’s risk environment is an important objective of the 
firm level criticality indicators such as those in the framework in Table 6.3. in Appendix B.  
However, in order to accomplish this, risk monitoring and mitigation must be integrated into 
broader firm practices and a complementary ethos must be diffused throughout the organization.  
Without management support and a firm culture congruent with cross-functional collaboration 
and information sharing, the firm-level approach to criticality is likely to fail, particularly in 
organizations that follow a silo structure or a rigid hierarchical structure.  In addition to firm 
culture and organizational structure, the success of firm level criticality mitigation is dependent 
on communication with management and key decision makers.  Given the complexity of 
criticality, the importance of clear, concise communication about supply risk and mitigation to 
management cannot be understated.  Particularly in cases where the appropriate mitigation 
strategy is cost and resource intensive (e.g. product re-design or new material development), 
leadership buy-in is crucial. 
 
 Conclusions 
In this paper we presented a review of literature addressing firm-level criticality and 
conducted a two-part gap analysis to better understand the differences among current approaches 
and scopes of criticality management.   The first component of the research gap that this work 
attempts to fill is to understand some of the specific ways that individual firms are impacted by 
criticality.  To do so, we considered criticality in terms of commonly understood and commonly 
experienced threats to firm viability such as loss of revenue, loss of market share, and loss of 
profit. Although this is a large and complex question that remains incompletely answered, this 
work does identify specific firm-level costs related to criticality.  For example, in the Rolls-
Royce scenario in the aviation case, we established the material intensity of rhenium by mass and 
cost in one Trent XWB engine.  Using this information along with publicly available data about 
the list price of these engines, the gross margin earned by these engines, and historical rhenium 
prices, it was determined that the 2008 spike in the price of rhenium was equal to a loss of almost 
10% in gross margin relative to the 2017 price of rhenium.   
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Although the controlled environment agriculture case doesn’t demonstrate specific firm-level 
costs related to criticality, it does demonstrate specific impacts.  For example, manufacturers of 
LED lighting used in horticultural applications face strong competing demand and price 
competition. Whereas the demand for rhenium is concentrated in the aviation industry, there are 
multiple uses for each critical material needed to manufacture LED grow lights, as well as 
multiple uses for LEDs themselves.  Second, in their annual SEC 10-K filings, LED 
manufacturer CREE explicitly acknowledges the firm’s vulnerability to supply constraints 
outside of its control, such as reliance on sole or limited source suppliers.  CREE also reports 
impacts that include high price volatility and variation in consistency and availability. Finally, 
CREE makes note of the cost and difficulty of complying with regulations, such as the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, on material sourced from areas of 
geopolitical conflict.   
Both cases offer a second insight to specific firm-level costs. In the aviation case we plotted 
the price of rhenium against firm-level financial performance data over time.  Using annual and 
quarterly revenue and profit results from Boeing, General Electric Aviation, and Pratt & Whitney 
we established correlational industry trends in line with the Rolls-Royce findings.  In the 
controlled environment agriculture case, we plotted the price of rare earth elements and gallium 
against the annual financial performance of CREE, a major manufacturer of LEDs used for 
horticultural lighting applications.  The ways and extents to which both aviation and horticultural 
lighting manufacturing firms are impacted by criticality are extremely complex and are not yet 
causally substantiated.  However, these findings establish a basis for pursuing the next 
component of the research gap addressed by this work: how can firms create a criticality risk 
assessment framework that can be used efficiently and effectively for their specific business 
operations and strategies?  That is, how can individual firms monitor critical material supply 
risk?   
In addressing the second component of the research gap, we found that critical material 
supply risk assessment has two primary characteristics across existing frameworks and 
approaches, independent of the size and scope of the assessing entity.  The first is the 
quantification of externally driven risk factors such as geological and economic availability; 
policy and regulation; geopolitical risk; environmental risk; etc.  Although different firms do use 
some of the same indicators, they also use some unique indicators. The second characteristic is 
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that criticality is generally addressed on an aggregate basis (e.g. global, national, industry), rather 
than on an individual firm basis.  While fundamentally relevant to criticality, we assert that 
external factors can’t be directly controlled by individual firms.  Similarly, criticality challenges 
faced by firms necessarily vary from those faced at the industry level or above.  Finally, because 
firms inherently differ in size, scope, and resources, the focus on external factors also presents a 
challenge to successful criticality mitigation at the firm level.   
Given these findings and the resulting conclusion that no existing criticality assessment 
framework was sufficient for individual firms, the main contribution of this paper is a criticality 
assessment framework that uses dynamic, micro-level, internal indicators to guide firm decision-
making related specifically to criticality risk at the firm level.  Risk analysis was used to develop 
a new framework to be used by firms with existing, internal, firm-level data.  Potential threats to 
an uninterrupted material supply (e.g. price volatility, supplier reliability, substitutability) were 
determined, and correlations between potential events and likely outcomes were identified (e.g. 
loss of revenue due to a price spike in a material needed to produce a good with a high material 
fraction of product cost).  
Although we contend that all of the metrics proposed in the firm-level criticality framework 
are relevant to all firms, there are no doubt metrics not included that are necessary for some firms 
and not others, as well as some metrics in our framework that are more or less relevant across 
firms.  Therefore, the framework needs to be integrated into individual firm decision-making 
processes and adapted as appropriate; this requires some interpretation and analysis by individual 
firms.  For example, selection criteria and indicator weightings will vary across and within firms 
based on things like which critical materials are used and the market characteristics of the 
products being manufactured with those materials.  One application may be more susceptible to 
low production efficiency and another may be more vulnerable to price elasticity.  
As shown in the criticality assessment tool, some indicators will have higher risk than others.  
Sensitivity analysis should be conducted to determine the appropriate risk levels for each 
indicator used to assess criticality at a given firm.  A similar approach is recommended for 
evaluating supply risk mitigation strategies which will impact firms differently.  For example, 
one firm may benefit greatly from using long-term supply agreements whereas another firm may 
be better off developing a substitute material or increasing material utilization.  Integration of the 
framework also requires buy-in from internal stakeholders throughout the organization, starting 
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with management.  Similarly, internal data related to supply is still, to some extent, contingent on 
the knowledge and activities of stakeholders up the supply chain.  That is, some “internal” data 
requires external input and insight.  For example, material cost data can be elusive and time 
consuming to identify in large supply chains, especially when firms purchase components and 
parts rather than raw material. This lack of supply chain transparency is an anticipated barrier to 
successful implementation of the framework.   
 
4.1. Recommendations for Future Research 
This research has led to several key findings about the way we think about, measure, 
monitor, and value critical materials.  It has also uncovered opportunities for firms to improve 
their analysis of metrics relevant to criticality risk.  One way to help companies do this is to 
apply the framework proposed in this work to real world data from companies that need to 
manage criticality risk.  Doing so would allow us to explore different ways that firms might use 
and interpret the indicators in general.  For example, can the indicators be used to effectively 
identify thresholds or tipping points beyond which risk exceeds a firm’s tolerance?  Which 
indicators do firm’s find most useful?  Does the utility of a given indicator vary across market 
segments or industries?  Another area of exploration is the impact of integrated supply chains on 
criticality mitigation.  Can large conglomerates actually influence the production of critical 
materials, or are broader market forces that cause supply disruptions more powerful?  Are there 
manufacturing companies that own mines or rights to mines used to produce critical materials?  
If so, is this strategy cost effective?  Future research should also address how firms might use 
modular manufacturing to mitigate risk; is it feasible to design technologies with contingency 
components in case of supply disruption?   
This work focuses squarely on the firm perspective because, through their decision making, 
firms have considerable influence on the direction and progression of technology which, in turn, 
has ramifications for advancements in sustainability.  Specifically, we focus on manufacturing 
firms at the upper end of the supply chain.  However, because the impacts of criticality aren’t 
contained to any one tier in the supply chain, another important area of future research is the 
impact of criticality to stakeholders across the supply chain.  For example, in the aviation case 
some additional stakeholders include the airlines that purchase aircraft, the consumers who travel 
by air, and businesses and organizations that rely on air transport.  In other words, the cost and 
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availability of fuel-efficient jet engines have macro level economic implications.  Without the 
ability to affordably move people and goods in a timely fashion, barriers to economic growth and 
technological advancement—such as increased cost, decreased performance, and decreased 
productivity—begin to emerge.  In the controlled environment agriculture case, additional 
stakeholders include the farmers who rely on horticultural lighting to produce food as well as 
food distributors, food retailers, restaurants, and all consumers.  The cost and availability of 
lighting needed for agriculture have wide-reaching impacts ranging from the profitability of food 
production to the availability and accessibility of food.  As growing conditions change and 
present new challenges stemming from climate change, it becomes more difficult to maintain 
yields and less profitable to produce food in the first place. 
The research presented here addresses the use of critical materials in two industries, aviation 
and controlled environment agriculture.  While we did compare and contrast the ways that each 
of these industries is impacted by critical material supply disruptions, we did not address the 
broader impact of competition for the same materials across industries.  One example of cross-
industry competition for critical materials relates to LEDs because there are many different 
technologies that rely on this technology.  These applications include general lighting, controlled 
environment agriculture (i.e. horticultural lighting), electronics (e.g., TVs, smartphones, video 
displays), and medical treatments such as LED phototherapy.  If there is a scarcity event causing 
a price spike in the critical materials needed to manufacture LEDs, the impact will, in general, 
vary by industry.  However, one industry of particular note is food production.  Given that food 
security is now tied to criticality (due to the projected growth of controlled environment 
agriculture that relies heavily on LED lighting), future work should emphasize impact beyond a 
firm’s financial bottom line. 
Although this work is very price focused due to its emphasis on the criticality impact to 
firms, it’s important to think about how environmental regulations might disrupt supply chains.  
Future work should investigate firm risk on the basis of exposure to environmental issues which 
may include soil, air, and water contamination; radioactive waste; and carbon emissions.  
Finally, future work should apply a formal, systems thinking approach to identify 
interdependencies within and between firms that impact criticality mitigation.  This should focus 
on the organizational design, communication, and culture within a specific firm, and how those 




5.1.  Cobalt Criticality  
Cobalt is a critical metal used in a broad array of products including aircraft engines, 
turbines, magnets, and cutting tools.  Because two of cobalt’s most notable characteristics 
include extremely high supply concentration and constant price volatility, it serves as an 
instructive example for understanding the firm level impact of criticality.   
In the early 1970s, 40% of all land based cobalt reserves were in Zaire (currently known as 
the Democratic Republic of Congo).  Zaire and neighboring Zambia controlled 2/3 of world 
production of cobalt.  During this period, the U.S. (which did not produce any cobalt 
domestically), was the world’s largest consumer of cobalt but had access to just one supplier of 
Zairian cobalt, the African Metals Corporation.  As shown in Figure 5.1., price volatility is 
evident in the periods from 1966 to 1976 and from 1980 to 2002 during which year-over-year 
cobalt price changes were as high as 41%.  The most famous and drastic cobalt price spike 
followed a political rebellion in Zaire (Alonso et al 2007).  Between 1977 and 1979, prices 
increased by as much as 380%, causing firms to reevaluate products, production technologies, 
and sourcing routes (Alonso et al 2007).  The impact was so great that even national policies 
were changed (Alonso et al 2007). 
Outcomes from market instability-derived supply problems extended from price increases to 
product changes requiring substitution and new material development. The extent of the 
outcomes appears to have been exacerbated by the high global dependence on production from a 
single region, Zaire’s Shaba province, and by the importance of cobalt for crucial defense 
applications. Although many of the factors contributing to cobalt price instability over the past 
50 years are external, and therefore outside of the control of individual firms (e.g. political 
rebellion, global macroeconomic trends, production capacity, refining capacity, and 
transportation routes), cobalt is an apt example for our purposes because it highlights how 
material availability affects individual firms and what individual firms have done to mitigate it.  
Forced to reevaluate their production options in light of cobalt cost increases, firms responded by 
using material substitution, developing new technologies, identifying alternative material 
suppliers and sources, hoarding and rationing, and reclamation and recycling.  For example, the 
magnet industry substituted lower cobalt containing alloys for applications with limitations on 
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weight, size, and energy (USGS, 2006).  Similarly, although reducing the use of cobalt in 
superalloys was difficult due to limited substitutes and a simultaneous increase in demand for jet 
engines, the development of a recycling process for scrap superalloys doubled cobalt recovery 
after 1978 (Blechman, 1985). 
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6.2.  Regulatory and Compliance Indicators 
Table 6.2.1.  Regulatory and Compliance Indicators 
Indicator Category Study 
Impact of ecological implications on biodiversity (using ReCiPe) Environment Bensch et al. 2015 
Environmental regulation (e.g. policy decisions, legislation) Environment Gardner et al. 2018;  
Hallstedt et al. 2017;  
Nieto et al. 2013 
Socio- and ecological impact risk Environment Hallstedt et al. 2017 
Anthropogenic vs. natural flows Environment Hallstedt et al. 2017 
Impact of ecological implications on human health (using 
ReCiPe) 
Environment Bensch et al. 2015 
Likelihood of substance becoming unavailable due to the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of 
Chemicals regulation (REACH) 
Environment Lloyd et al. 2012 
Electric vehicle (ELV) directive non-compliance Environment Lapko et al. 2016 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of 
Chemicals regulation 
(REACH) non-compliance 
Environment Lapko et al. 2016 
Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) non-compliance Environment Lapko et al. 2016 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) non-
compliance 
Environment Lapko et al. 2016 
Emissions legislation non-compliance Geopolitical Lapko et al. 2016 
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (re: human 
trafficking and slavery) 
Supply Chain Lapko et al. 2016 
Conflict Elements Supply Chain Gardner et al. 2018; 
Hallstedt et al. 2017 
   
6.3.  Indicators in Existing Firm-Level Criticality Studies 


















































































































































Business Risk Impact on revenue Internal X 
         
Business Risk Ability to pass on cost Internal X 
         
Business Risk Vulnerability Internal 
        
X 
 
Business Risk Severity of impact of risk Internal 
       
X 
  
Business Risk Sales of product(s) containing 
critical material(s) as a percentage 
of total sales 
Internal 




Business Risk Current revenue from product(s) 
containing critical material(s) 
Internal 
       
X 
  
Business Risk Future projected revenue from 
product(s) containing critical 
material(s) 
Internal 
       
X 
  
Business Risk Potential cost increase Internal X X X 
       
Business Risk Unit cost of component/product 
containing critical material(s) 
Internal X X X 
       
Business Risk Unit cost of critical material(s) in 
component/product 
Internal X X X 
       
Business Risk Fraction of whole material cost for 
unit 
Internal X X X 
       
Business Risk Production costs (cash costs) Internal 
   
X 
      
Business Risk Risk to key customers Internal 
       
X 
  
Business Risk Material / component lead time External 
      
X 
   
Business Risk Concentration of revenue in few 
clients 
Internal 
      
X 
   
Business Risk Non-forecasted upside demand Internal 
      
X 
   
Business Risk Delivery capability (vs lead 
time/shortages) 
Internal 
      
X 
   
Business Risk Cost competition External 
      
X 
   
Business Risk Price pressure External 
      
X 
   
Co-Production Risk Co-production risk External X 
       
X 
 
Co-Production Risk By-product character / co-
production 
External 
      
X 
   
Co-Production Risk Companion metal fraction External 
    
X X 
    
Demand Risk Demand risk External X 
   
X 
     
Demand Risk Demand growth External 





   
Demand Risk Competing demand for a material External 




   
Demand Risk Demand from alternative 
applications 
External 
         
X 
Demand Risk Demand increase risk External 
    
X X 
    
Demand Risk Future demand technology External 
    
X X 
    
Demand Risk Demand fluctuation External 
      
X 
   
Environmental Environmental regulation (e.g. 
policy decisions, legislation) 
External 
        
X 
 
Environmental Soci- and ecological impact risk External 
        
X 
 
Environmental Anthropogenic vs natural flows External 
        
X 
 
Environmental Social and environmental 
restrictions 
External 
         
X 
Environmental Damage to health and ecosystems External 
     
X X 
   
Environmental Environmental regulations External 




Lack of investments in exploration 
of new sources 
External 
   
X 
      
Exploration and/or 
Mining 
Degree of exploration External 
   
X 
      
Exploration and/or 
Mining 
Investment in mining External 
   
X 
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Geopolitical Sourcing and geopolitical risk External X 
         
Geopolitical Political stability in sourcing 
countries 
External 
        
X 
 
Geopolitical Instability of producing country External 
    
X 
     
Geopolitical Stability of producing country External 
 
X X 
       
Geopolitical Country related risk External 
   
X 
      
Geopolitical International trade environment External 
         
X 
Geopolitical Political risk External 
    
X X 
    
Geopolitical Country risk political stability External 
    
X X 
    
Geopolitical Country risk policy potential External 
    
X X 
    
Geopolitical Country risk regulation External 
    
X X 
    
Geopolitical Export quotas External 
      
X 
   
Physical, Geological 
Abundance 
Abundance in earth's crust External X 






        
X 
 
Price Historic price volatility External X 
         
Price Material cost increase External 
        
X 
 
Price Sensitivity to price fluctuation External 
 
X 
    
X 
   
Price Price of critical material External 
       
X 
  
Price Price volatility External 
 
X X 
       
Price Price fluctuations External 
      
X 
   
Price Price increase External 
      
X 
   
Production Capacity Time needed to expand production 
capacity (exploration of new 
sources) 
External 




   
Production Capacity Limited production and capacity of 
mine, smelter, refinery, freight 
External 
   
X 
      
Production Capacity Mine/refinery capacity utilization External 
   
X 
      
Production Capacity Future market capacity External 
   
X 
      
Production Capacity Production shortages External 
      
X 
   
Recycling Recyclability External 
        
X 
 
Recycling Environmental regulation (e.g. 
policy decisions, legislation) 
External 
   
X X 
    
X 
Recycling Low/impossible recyclability (low 
recycling rate, volume, efficiency) 
External 




   





    
Recycling Material recovery competition External 
      
X 
   
Regulation REACH External 
      
X 
   
Regulation RoHS External 
      
X 
   
Regulation WEEE External 
      
X 
   
Regulation Emission legislation External 
      
X 
   
Regulation ELV directive External 
      
X 
   
Regulation Dodd Frank Act External 
      
X 
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Regulation California Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act 
External 
      
X 
   
Social Impact Conflict elements External 
        
X 
 
Social Impact Phosphorous content External 
        
X 
 
Stock / Reserves Lack of stock at exchanges, 
producers and manufacturers 
External 
   
X 
   
X 
  
Stock / Reserves Known stockpiles External 
       
X 
  
Stock / Reserves Stock keeping External 
   
X 
      
Substitutability Market substitutability External X 
         
Substitutability Firm's ability to substitute Internal X 
         
Substitutability Substitutability External 
        
X 
 
Substitutability Potential for substitution External 
       
X 
  





    
Substitutability No substitutes External 
      
X 
   
Supplier Risk High concentration in producing 
countries 
External 
    
X 
    
X 
Supplier Risk High concentration in producing 
companies 
External 
    
X 
    
X 
Supplier Risk Country concentration External 
   
X 
      
Supplier Risk Availability of resources needed to 
mine and produce critical materials 
External 
         
X 
Supplier Risk Concentration risk External 
    
X X 
    
Supplier Risk Country concentration External 
    
X X 
    
Supplier Risk Sourcing from different sources 
impacts quality 
External 
      
X 
   
Supplier Risk Monopoly supply External 
        
X 
 





       
Supplier Risk Producer diversity External 
         
X 
Supplier Risk Very concentrated supply chain External 
      
X 
   
Supplier Risk Niche monopolistic market External 
      
X 
   
Supplier Risk Single supplier available External 
      
X 
   
Supplier Risk Limited number of manufacturers 
and suppliers 
External 
      
X 
   
Supplier Risk Failure to provide required quality 
of materials 
External 
      
X 
   
Supplier Risk Failure to deliver/perform to client 
requirements 
External 
      
X 
   
Supply Percent of world supply used Internal X 
         
Supply Supply risk External 
        
X 
 
Supply Likelihood of disruption External 
       
X 
  
Supply Total market availability External 
       
X 
  
Supply Likelihood of disruption External 
 
X X 
       
Supply Likelihood of substance becoming 




       
Supply Current market balance External 
   
X 
      
Supply Supply reduction risk External 
    
X X 
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Supply Static reach reserves External 
    
X X 
    
Supply Static reach resources External 
    
X X 























6.4. Example Firm-Level Scorecard 
Table 6.4.1. Example Firm-Level Scorecard 
 
Criticality Risk Measurement Tool: Material / Product / Segment A  
Profitability  
Finance Procurement Marketing Production 
Risk Level Revenue 
(% of total) 
Price Volatility 
(% change) 
Price Elasticity Substitutability 
Very High 
    
High 
    
Medium  
    
Low 
    
Very Low 
    
 
Design & Product Concept Viability  
Finance Procurement Marketing Production 
Risk Level Material Fraction 
of Product Cost 
(%) 




Very High     
High     
Medium      
Low     
Very Low     
 
Production  
Finance Procurement Marketing Production 
Risk Level Gross Margin (%) Inventory Variance 
Ratio (%) 
Supplier Reliability Production 
Efficiency (%) 
Very High     
High     
Medium      
Low     











7.1. CEA Methodology Supplemental Information 
Table 7.1.1.: Critical Material Composition per Light Bulb (given in grams) 
Material CREE 









Critical material intensity was calculated based on the critical material composition of each 
light bulb and the other four key model inputs (population, dietary requirements, growing space, 
and lighting requirements).  To feed one person for one year under the scenario modeled in this 
work would require 12 high bay LED bulbs.  To feed the projected world population in 2050 
would require approximately 113.2 billion high bay LED bulbs. This is equivalent to 18,473 




















Vegetables: Dark Green 0.21 1.5 78 
Vegetables: Red & Orange 0.78 5.5 286 
Vegetables: Legumes 0.21 1.5 78 
Vegetables: Starchy 0.71 5 261 
Vegetables: Other 0.57 4 209 
Fruits 2 14 730 
TOTAL 4.5 31.5 1,642 
 
Given the types and quantities of food to produce in order to meet the stated dietary 
requirements, the amount of growing space can be calculated.  This is accomplished by using the 
recommended consumption of each crop in pounds, the yield per square foot of each crop in 
pounds, and the edible portion of each crop by percentage. For example, the USDA 
recommended consumption of dark green vegetables is 1.5 cups per week or 78 cups per year 
(2015).  To meet half of this requirement with spinach would require consumption of 39 cups per 
year.  Based on the density of spinach (30 grams per cup), a total of 2.59 pounds of spinach must 
be consumed annually.  According to the USDA, the edible portion of raw spinach is equal to 
72% (2018).  This means that, in order to produce 2.59 pounds for consumption, a total of 3.59 
pounds must be grown.  Using the required annual mass (3.59 pounds in this case), the average 
yield per square foot (0.30 pounds for spinach), and the number of annual harvests (6 for 
spinach), the amount of required physical growing space can be calculated.  To produce half of 
the annual requirement of dark green vegetables using spinach would require approximately 2 
square feet.  Table 7.1.3. lists the growing space needed per person, per year for each crop and 


























Broccoli 0.42 17.15 6 15.81 2 
Cantaloupe 1.00 252.45 4 16.69 16 
Cucumbers 0.25 12.32 6 9.13 2 
Eggplant 0.42 11.64 4 7.34 2 
Green 
Beans 
0.50 19.60 6 18.25 2 
Kale 0.50 2.51 7 25.55 1 
Onions 0.65 20.44 3 6.47 4 
Peppers 0.25 57.44 4 4.56 13 
Potatoes 0.37 57.48 3 3.81 16 
Spinach 0.30 3.60 6 12.31 2 
Strawberries 0.80 123.27 3 7.96 16 
Summer 
Squash 
0.40 30.85 7 20.44 2 
Tomatoes 0.38 62.53 4 6.84 10 
TOTAL  671   87 
 
Once the specific types and quantities of food are defined and the amount of growing space is 
established, the lighting requirements can be determined.  Plants require photosynthetically 
active radiation (PAR) to grow and thrive.  This type of light occurs specifically between 400 
and 700 nanometers on the spectral range and includes purple, blue, green, yellow, orange, and 
red light. Plants predominantly use blue, red, and purple rays and, depending on the stage of 
plant growth, different colors of light are more and less beneficial.  During the seedling stage, 
plants need more blue light.  During the vegetative stage, plants need more purple light.  Finally, 
during the flowering stage plants need more red light.  This is important because different 
artificial light bulbs emit light from different parts of the spectral range, and no current artificial 
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light technology can precisely replicate the light emitted from the sun.  This means that different 
light bulbs will emit light from different parts of the spectrum.   
Plants also need exposure to a certain amount and duration of photosynthetic light each day.  
This is quantified by two metrics. The amount of light needed to grow plants is a function of the 
daily light integral (DLI) (Runkle 2006).  The duration of light needed by each crop is a function 
of the photoperiod (Runkle 2006).  The DLI refers to the amount of light, measured in moles per 
square meter per day (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚2𝑑𝑑). The photoperiod refers to the duration of light, measured in 
hours per day (h/d).  Different types of crops have different DLI requirements and different 
photoperiods.  In this study there are two sets of light requirements, one for greens (i.e. spinach 
and kale), and one for the other 11 crops which fall into the category of tomatoes, melons, and 
vining crops.  Crops in the greens category have an optimal DLI of 16 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚2𝑑𝑑 and a minimum 
photoperiod of 14 ℎ/𝑑𝑑 (Runkle 2006).  Crops in the tomatoes, melons, and vining crops category 
have an optimal DLI of 35 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚2𝑑𝑑 and a minimum photoperiod of 18 ℎ/𝑑𝑑 (Runkle 2006). 
Once the DLI and the photoperiod have been established, the next step is to determine how to 
provide the corresponding amount of light needed.  In other words, we need to know how much 
of the light requirement for any given crop can be provided by one bulb.  The light output of 
bulbs is reported in terms of photosynthetic photon flux density (PPFD), which is a measure of 
the amount of light emitted in a specific area each second (𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚2𝑠𝑠).  Although manufacturer 
specifications for light bulbs aren’t provided in terms of DLI, the DLI can be used to calculate 
lighting requirements in terms of PPFD. For example, greens have a target PPFD of 243, and 
tomatoes, melons, and vining crops have a target PPFD of 347.  Based on manufacturer data, we 
know that the CREE linear LED fixture used in our model produces an average PPFD of 805 
𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚2𝑠𝑠.  To provide the target PPFD of 347 𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚2𝑠𝑠 required by tomatoes, melons, and 
vining crops would require 0.43 CREE high bay LED fixtures per square meter.  The final step is 
to convert fixtures per square meter to fixtures per square feet.  The average PPFD for the high 














































7.2. Determining Critical Material Intensity of Horticultural Lighting Technologies 









7.3.  Mass and Cost of Critical Materials by Lighting Technology 
Table 7.3.1. Mass and Cost of Critical Materials by Lighting Technology 
 
Mass / Bulb (g) Critical Material Cost / Bulb ($) 
HID Metal Halide 6.10E-01 3.37E-02 
T8 LFL 1.69E-03 7.24E-05 


















8.1.  Price Volatility and Firm Performance 
To further understand the dynamic between critical material price volatility and firm 
performance, annual and quarterly data was analyzed for three firms that rely heavily on 
rhenium: Boeing, General Electric (GE), and Pratt & Whitney (a subsidiary of United 
Technologies).  Boeing is the world’s largest jet manufacturer, and GE and Pratt & Whitney are 
two of the three largest consumers of rhenium in the U.S. (alloy manufacturer Cannon Muskegon 
is the third largest).  Figure 1 shows the percent change in the annual profit of each firm between 
2007 and 2012, relative to the price of rhenium.  Figure 3 shows the change in quarterly profit 
for each firm over the same time period.  The trailing performance of each firm after 2008’s 
massive rhenium price spike suggests a negative correlation between the price of rhenium and 
profit.  This is particularly evident in Boeing’s performance.  The impact appears to bottom out 
around 2010 when a gradual recovery can be seen for all three firms in 2011 and in GE and 
Boeing in 2012. 
 
Figure 8.1.1. Annual Price of Rhenium vs. Annual Profit of GE, Boeing, and Pratt & Whitney, 







































Price of Rhenium vs. Profit
(Annual)
GE Boeing Pratt & Whitney Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.2. Quarterly Price of Rhenium vs. Quarterly Profit of GE, Boeing, and Pratt & 
Whitney, 2007 - 2012  
 
Both the annual and the quarterly data suggest an impact and recovery cycle in which an 
initial supply disruption (caused by the 2008 price spike), causes both short- and long-term 
damage to firm performance.  Within four quarters of the rhenium price spike, GE profit 
declined by -81% and Boeing profit declined by -107%.  Pratt & Whitney profit also declined, 
but more gradually.  Within five quarters of the rhenium price spike, Pratt & Whitney 
experienced a -28% decline in profit.  Volatility persists among all three firms over the 8 quarters 











































Price of Rhenium vs. Profit
(Quarterly)
Rhenium GE Boeing Pratt & Whitney
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Boeing Annual Performance Variation
vs. Price of Rhenium
Revenue (% Change) Profit (% Change) Rhenium Price (% Change)
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Boeing Quarterly Performance Variation 
vs. Price of Rhenium 
Revenue (% Change) Profit (% Change) Rhenium Price (% Change)
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Figure 8.1.8. Annual Variation in General Electric (GE) Aviation Financial Performance vs. 












































GE Financial Performance vs. Price of Rhenium
(Aviation Segment)
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GE Annual Performance Variation 
vs. Price of Rhenium (Aviation Segment)
Revenue (% Change) Profit (% Change) Rhenium Price (% Change)
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Figure 8.1.10. Quarterly Variation in General Electric (GE) Aviation Financial Performance vs. 





































































































































































































GE Quarterly Performance Variation 
vs. Price of Rhenium
Revenue (% Change) Profit (% Change) Price of Rhenium (% Change)
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Pratt & Whitney Annual Financial Performance 
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Pratt & Whitney Annual Performance Variation
vs. Price of Rhenium
Revenue (% Change) Profit (% Change) Price of Rhenium (% Change)
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Pratt & Whitney Quarterly Performance
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